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The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, --accompanied by-- General David C. Jones, U. S. Air Force, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General P. X. Kelley, Assistant Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/GGDC, MR
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MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA OF AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT (AWACS) AND F-15 ENHANCEMENTS

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MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1981

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United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in Room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Tower (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, Denton, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd, Nunn, Hart, Exon and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, Staff Director; Francis J. Sullivan, Minority Staff Director; James F. McGovern, General Counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, Minority Counsel; Christine E. Cowart, Chief Clerk; Michael B. Donley, Professional Staff Member; Robert S. Dotson, Professional Staff Member; Edward B. Kenney, Professional Staff Member; James R. Locher, III, Professional Staff Member; Jose E. Martinez, Professional Staff Member; Carl M. Smith, Professional Staff Member; Kathleen Troia, Professional Staff Member; Richard D. Finn, Research

Assistant; Drew A. Harker, Research Assistant; Ann E. Sauer, Special Assistant; and Brenda K. Hudson, Staff Assistant.

Committee Members' Staff Assistants present: Dennis F. Sharon, Assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Heftri, Assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, Assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, Assistant to Senator Jepsen; Bill Furniss, Assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul Schreiber, Assistant to Senator Denton; Frank Krebs, Assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, Assistant to Senator Byrd; Arnold Punaro, Assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, Assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, Assistant to Senator Levin.

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Chairman Tower: Today's hearing is the first public presentation before the Senate of the Administration's justification for the proposal to sell an enhanced air defense package to Saudi Arabia. This package includes AWACS aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and conformal tankers, and AIM-9L missiles for Saudi F-15 aircraft.

The Armed Services Committee has been asked by the Majority Leader, Senator Baker, and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy, to study the military and technical implications of the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia and to report its findings prior to a vote by the Foreign Relations Committee on the resolution of

disapproval.

This past Friday the Committee met in executive session with witnesses from the Central Intelligence Agency and the technical experts from the Department of Defense. Testimony presented at that time was supportive of the President's sale proposal. The Armed Services Committee's inquiry will focus on the military and technical implications of the sale.

The membership is asked to keep this focus in mind when questioning the witnesses. There are four basic questions that this Committee must address: the legitimate defense requirements of Saudi Arabia, the threat posed by this air defense package to the security of Israel, the risk of compromise of United States military technology if this sale is approved, and the benefits of this sale for improving the potential of U.S. military forces to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf region.

The proposed sale of this air defense package to Saudi Arabia will be one of the most difficult foreign policy decisions that the Senate will be asked to make this year. The important U.S. relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia couuld be affected by the outcome, as could U.S. policies for the Middle East.

In that this is the first public hearing of the Senate devoted to this issue, I am dismayed that so many of my

colleagues have already concluded that the proposed sale is not in the national interest of the United States. In addition, I am seriously concerned about the substantial miunderstandings of the capabilities of the AWACS aircraft and of the importance of the sale proposal to U.S. security interests. Today's hearings will provide the opportunity to overcome these misunderstandings.

On behalf of the Committee, I extend a sincere welcome to today's witnesses: The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense; General David C. Jones, United States Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General P. X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps, Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and former Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The Committee will proceed to hear statements by Secretary Weinberger and General Jones and a technical briefing before posing questions to the witnesses. I should like to advise everyone here that you are guests of the Committee, that we have to maintain decorum in this chamber if we are to get our business done. We do not permit any expressions of approval or disapproval of anything that the witnesses or members of the Committee may say.

I would like at this point to yield to the senior Democrat present today, Senator Jackson, for any opening statement that he would like to make.

Senator Jackson: Mr. Chairman, I think you have outlined it quite well, that this is a major foreign and defense policy situation. I would hope that the witnesses would give us the history of this project from the previous Administration and this Administration. I think this is very important.

There are rumors going around that State knew nothing about it, that Defense has gone ahead and make commitments. I can say, Mr. Chairman, that I was briefed by the State Department representatives, at their request, late in March. And I asked specifically if -- that related at that time to the F-15 and the tankers and certain enhancement features for the F-15.

I asked specifically, what about AWACS. They said it is not involved. So I think that the most important thing we can do is to get the proper foundation, the background, to lay at rest any rumors as to how this program evolved.

And I would hope the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, would outline the history of that, and also the backdrop on what recommendations the Air Force, the Department of Defense or any element of the Department of Defense, recommendations regarding turning the AWACS over to the Shah. I think we need that whole background and it would be helpful, because there are time limitations on asking questions.

So from there we can go and address the larger question

as to what kind of arrangement needs to be put together here. I do not know of anyone who disputes the need for AWACS. There are four of them there now.

The argument is over the management of them, and I think that is what the country is asking. And I would hope the witnesses would address those questions, especially in the context of the way we lay down very stringent rules as far as NATO is concerned. But I would like to get the history of what happened on AWACS with the Shah right on down to the present time, when the decision and commitment was made to the Saudis.

Chairman Tower: Mr. Secretary, you may proceed as you see fit. We will be glad to include any written or printed material in the record that you would like placed in the record, and you may proceed in any way you see fit. Secretary Weinberger.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY: GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GENERAL P. X. KELLEY, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. Chairman and Senators, I appreciate the opportunity to be before the Committee to present the Administration's case for selling the AWACS aircraft and other air defense enhancements to Saudi Arabia.

With respect to Senator Jackson's question, I will certainly be glad, in responding to questions, to give the somewhat limited history that I know, which extends only a couple of weeks before Inauguration Day. General Jones, however, was here for much of the period that I think he described and can supplement the historical questions. I will be glad to consider with you and respond to questions about what has happened since January.

And I would, if I might, say as a preface that at all times on these matters the State and Defense Departments, as well as the Administration, have been united on the basic issues that are involved here.

The President's decision to sell this equipment to the Saudi Government has stimulated very deep emotions and intense debate, which have obscured the core issues. And I

think it is time that the real issues be put before the Congress and the American people, so that they can be examined as dispassionately and fully as their importance requires.

The case for the sale of this air defense enhancement package to Saudi Arabia is very simple: AWACS and the other air defense equipment will make a significant and a necessary contribution to the security interests of the United States and all of our allies and friends, including specifically the NATO nations, Israel itself, Japan, and of course the Mideast countries, in what is a very volatile part of the world. The President's decision to proceed with this sale was based upon this central fact and was reached only after considerable review and agreement with the basic decision reached by prior Administrations.

As you are aware, the Saudi air defense enhancement package consists of four components: the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, the AWACS, to provide the necessary low-altitude surveillance and early warning of air attack, along with associated ground-based command, control and communications equipment to provide a complete air defense surveillance and control network; conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and mission endurance of Saudi Arabia's F-15 fighter aircraft; AIM-9L Sidewinder air to air missiles to improve the F-15's defense aerial combat

capability; and KC-707 aerial tankers to refuel both the F-15's and AWACS. The total cost of this equipment to Saudi Arabia will be some $8.5 billion.

This Saudi equipment package is an important part of a comprehensive United States strategy for Southwest Asia and is designed to increase the security of friendly countries in an area of the world which is vital both to the United States and to our western allies. In this context, we think the sale will directly serve the United States' national interests in the following ways:

First, it will help the Saudis defend their vital oil facilities against surprise air attack, and in this way the sale responds to the legitimate security requirements of a country whose cooperation is central to the defense of the entire region's security and thus to our own.

Secondly, it will help rebuild confidence in the United States as a reliable partner in the region. This sense of confidence and security is essential in encouraging countries in the area to take the political risks a durable peace in the Middle East demands.

Thirdly, it will advance our goal of increasing the security of states in the Gulf Region by providing a foundation for closer U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation and for Saudi efforts to develop cooperation with all of her Mideast neighbors in other security related areas.

Finally, it will increase the effectiveness of our own military capabilities if we were ever called upon to deploy U.S. forces to that area. The extensive logistics base and support infrastructure that will be a necessary part of this equipment package will be fully compatible with the defense needs of this whole vital area.

Saudi oil resources are vast and irreplaceable. We need them and our allies need them. The flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the region immediately bordering it in the Gulf is crucial to the international finances, domestic production, employment around the globe and world trade. The destruction of the oil-gathering and loading facilities in Saudi Arabia, or their control by a hostile power, could tip the balance of power in the world.

The Saudi oil resources are vulnerable and threatened. Virtually all of their oil production facilities are located in the East, near the Arabian Gulf coast, easily accessible to attack from across the Gulf. The conflict between Iran and Iraq disproved one widely held assumption: that oil-producing states acting in their own self-interesat would never threaten each other's oil fields, refineries or transport facilities. But as we have seen, Iran and Iraq have done just exactly that; each has been required to curtail oil exports vitally needed by the West.

I might add at this point that Saudi Arabia has

increased its oil production to accommodate that oil loss while keeping prices below those of its OPEC colleagues. This is simply another of many instances of Saudi assistance to our national interests.

As the anti-Communist leader of moderate Arab Gulf States and as the largest Free World oil producer, Saudi Arabia needs a strong defense against potential military threats from unstable, revolutionary Iran; from radical Iraq; and from Marxist South Yemen. The Saudi Kingdom also must increase its defense against Soviet or Soviet-inspired military threats from Ethiopia, Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and from the USSR itself. The new entente between Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen -- each of which has significant amounts of Soviet military equipment and increasing numbers of Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers -- introduces a new and a most unwelcome dimension into the threat calculus of the region.

Given this situation, the Saudis face several difficulties in deploying an adequate air defense. This very large country has widely scattered, concentrated population centers, military installations, ports, airfields, and oil facilities to protect. Most of these valuable targets are on or near the Arabian Gulf or Red Sea coasts, which means that it is not possible to place early warning radars and air defenses far forward -- for example,

between the oil facilities and potential threats from across the Gulf -- to provide adequate prctection.

With current Saudi capabilities, an attack by low-flying aircraft could not be detected by ground-based radar until it was within two to four minutes of the oil fields. Even under the best conditions, no air force could respond to this threat in time.

AWACS would allow the Saudi Air Force to detect low-level attacking enemy aircraft up to 200 miles from the oil fields, depending on the altitude, of course, of the Saudi plane. The Saudi Air Force would then have enough time to scramble and intercept enemy aircraft before they reach te oil fields. Without AWACS, this early warning capability would not exist, no matter how many ground radars might be employed.

The AIM-9L Sidewinder air to air missiles would give the Saudi Air Force the capability to intercept attacking aircraft head-on. This capability would greatly improve the chances cf shooting them down before they are able to bomb the oil facilities or other Saudi targets. Without the AIM-9L, Saudi interceptors would have to maneuver behind the attacking aircraft to fire their older, less capable missile, and this would assure that hostile aircraft could reach vital coastal targets before being engaged and shct down.

Conformal fuel tanks and KC-707 tankers would allow Saudi F-15's to be based in west central and southwestern Saudi Arabia, where they would not be vulnerable to a surprise enemy attack and from which they could sustain combat over the oil facilities even if bases in eastern Saudi Arabia were put out of action. And the KC-707 tankers also would allow AWACS to remain on-station for extended periods of time.

So for all of these reasons and for another reason, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee -- and that is the threat from Yemen and Ethiopia and other areas that have been now so heavily infected by Soviet advances, are other areas where the AWACS is needed by Saudi Arabia to give them advanced early warning of possible threats from those directions.

The air defense package would improve the Saudi capability to deter and if necessary defend against these air attacks. The result will be a more secure Saudi Arabia which would be an anchor of stability within the region -- and the region, of course, includes Israel -- and a bulwark against challenges and coercion from outside the region. Such a stable and secure Saudi Arabia clearly servces the security interests of the United States, and certainly serves the security interests of Israel, the NATO countries and Japan.

Last fall, soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraqi war, the United States Government responded to an urgent Saudi request for assistance by deploying four U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia to augment their air defenses. They are still there today, providing the surveillance and early warning capability necessary to defend the oil facilities. This continuing response by the United States has helped in the process of rebuilding Saudi -- and regional -- confidence in the United States as a reliable security partner.

But the Saudi Government, like any sovereign state, recognizes its right and responsibility to provide for its own legitimate defense requirements. It is in this spirit that the request to purchase AWACS and the other air defense items was made by Saudi Arabia. Consummation of the sale of this equipment, which both we and they agree they need urgently for their security requirements, will further reinforce the military to military relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This in turn will strengthen the security of the entire region, and it will permit us to work with the Saudis toward a more peaceful and stable situation in the whole region, again specifically including Israel.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that future U.S.-Saudi relations would be very adversely affected

if this sale is rejected. Such a rejection would cause the Saudis to doubt the reliability of U.S. commitment and the ability of American Presidents to conduct foreign policy. Such an impression will also make it far less likely that Saudi Arabia and others will agree to the kinds of security cooperation, joint planning, combined exercises, and advanced preparation for sharing of facilities and support which we feel are needed if the United States is to defend the shared security interests in Southwest Asia.

Furthermore, rejection of the sale would confirm a too widely held opinion in the mid-Easet that the United States is solely concerned with the wishes of the Israeli Government, to the exclusion of all other interests.

This Saudi air defense enhancement package has been designed to meet the significant Saudi defense requirements that I have discussed while improving the security of Israel and all the other states in the region. Israel has increased its margin of military superiority over its Arab adversaries since the 1973 war. With or without the AWACS and the F-15 enhancements, the Saudi Air Force realistically poses no significant threat to the security of Israel. This is true even in the context of a general regional conflict, and this assessment is supported by the U.S. intelligence community.

These are the technical facts: the AWACS is an unarmed

flying radar platform which has no intelligence collection capabilities. It cannot detect ground targets such as tanks and it cannot operate effectively with the air forces of other countries without extensive joint tranking and a sophisticated communications network, which only the United States could provide. The five AWACS aircraft which would be sold to Saudi Arabia are sufficient to maintain only one continuous 24 hours per day, surveillance orbit.

Israel's air defense system makes all these arguments against the AWACS academic. The Saudis fully recognize that Israel's air defense is extraordinarily capable. Saudi missions into Israeli airspace, either to engage Israeli aircraft or to strike Israeli targets, would be prohibitively costly and would leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable to air attack from every direction.

The simple fact is that this sale will not alter the Arab-Israeli balance of power materially nor jeopardize Israel's security. President Reagan is committed to protecting Israel's security and to preserving Israel's qualitative edge and its ability to defeat any combination of hostile forces in the region. The proposed Saudi sale neither casts doubt on that commitment nor compromises Israeli capabilities.

There is another point, Mr. Chairman, which is related to the point of Israeli security. The Saudis do not face a

choice between the U.S. AWACS or nothing. The British NIMROD airborne early warning aircraft, currently under enhanced development, has capabilities comparable to AWACS, which could be enhanced, which in some cases exceed it. And NIMROD's will be operationally deployed very shortly, and the Saudis would turn to the British to purchase these aircraft should AWACS be denied, and we know of no limitations that would be placed upon their use.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the Saudis will obtain an enhanced air defense capability; rather, it is whether we lose all credibility with the Saudis, their moderate neighbors, and many other countries and the ability to develop a Mideast policy by refusing to sell. We have the choice of benefiting from the closer security cooperation and the economic benefits, including jobs, which would flow from the sale of the U.S. equipment package to Saudi Arabia, or of yielding the friendship of valuable allies.

For the Israelis, the question is whether their long-term security interests are better served by a continuing and strengthened U.S. role in Saudi Arabia, or by a Saudi Arabia with all the increased military capabilities the AWACS would bring, through the NIMROD purchase, but far less friendly to the United States and with continuing, perhaps unneeded hostility of Israel.

Before I conclude, let me address just one other point. The AWACS is a very capable system, but selling it to Saudi Arabia does not pose significant or serious risks that sensitive technology will be compromised. The AWACS does not represent the ultimate in U.S. radar or computer technology. The radar aboard is mid-1960's Pulse Doppler textbook technology, and a comparable computer is available commercially.

While these systems are superior to anything the Soviets currently have in their inventory, a new Soviet airborne early warning aircraft has been under development for some time and is expected to have a capability quite similar to our AWACS. So the new Soviet system should be in the operational inventory quite soon, prior to the time the AWACS is delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1985.

In any event, the Saudis have an outstanding record of protecting sensitive U.S. equipment and information, and the Saudis recognize and accept the need for special safeguards in this case. Consequently, they have agreed to extensive, jointly planned and monitored security arrangements that fully satisfy our stringent U.S. requirements for the safeguarding of our equipment.

I will only conclude by saying that we are convinced -- and the President is convinced -- that detailed and dispassionate analysis shows that the proposed air defense

enhancement package for Saudi Arabia will make an important contribution to the security of all states in the region -- Israel as well as Saudi -- and that it will promote our efforts to create a strategic consensus in the Southwest Asia region, and thereby further our national security intersts.

The proposed sale successfully balances the imperative of Israeli security with the need to respond to threats to essential natural resources and regional stability. It provides equipment which meets the defensive requirements of a close friend and key state in the region in a way which also protects sensitive technology and makes a tangible contribution to U.S. military capabilities.

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. Chairman, I have appreciated very much the opportunity to present this statement. With your indulgence, General Jones has a statement that he would like to present, and we have the short technical briefing we mentioned at the beginning.

Chairman Tower: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General Jones.

General Jones: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to justify today, particularly to try to clear up some misunderstandings on how we got where we are and what about the capability of AWACS.

For the last few years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have spent more time on worrying about the increased threat to Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf in particular than on any other subject. And we are all familiar with the great turmoil in that region: the fall of the Shah, the Iran-Iraq war, the instability in Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan, and in some ways most importantly, of greatest concern is the great Soviet buildup opposite Iran. They are much more capable now than they were a couple of years ago. And we have been working hard to increase our capability.

Our presence in the region with our combatant ships of the Navy, with prepositioning, with increasing our power projection capability, our organization, forming of the

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which General Kelley first headed, and to work with nations in the region. We have got construction going on in Oman, but the sine qua non of the entire operation is Saudi Arabia. And it is important that we do have good and close relationships with Saudi Arabia, and there is increasing confidence in the United States, a willingness to work with us.

In March of 1979 when there was a conflict between North and South Yemen and concern in Saudi Arabia, they asked and we deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia. They stayed there about 45 days and were very helpful in providing some potential air defense capability.

And then just about a year ago, early October 1980, we deployed four AWACS to Saudi Arabia just shortly after the breakout of the war between Iran and Iraq, and they have been there ever since. And they have been performing in a magnificent way with extremely high reliability, very good coverage.

We have about a thousand U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia now, both in the security assistance and in support of the AWACS in radars and other equipment. Relationships are very good.

Saudi Arabia's resources are very vulnerable. You look around the world with countries who have resources. You can probably not find one that has greater vulnerability -- its

vital resources with most of the production of the oil right on the coast on the Persian Gulf -- and air defense is essential.

And as Senator Jackson said, there is no question about the need of an airborne capability because of being very close to the Gulf and potential enemies.

Saudi Arabia does not want to be totally dependent upon the United States. As the Secretary understood, there is an interest in having that capability by various nations, and Saudi Arabia is one.

They need an air defense capability of their own, certainly not one that could cope with an entire Soviet threat -- and that is our particular concern is the Soviet threat -- but some capability. And we think it is in our best interest to help them with equipment and with training with the potential for augmentation very rapidly if required.

And it is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposal by the Administration to enhance the air defense in Saudi Arabia is clearly in the best interests of the United States.

I will limit my comments to the AWACS because that is the controversial issue, the one that is of greatest interest to people. There is no question on the need, it has been pointed out. The question is how do we handle it. And later on I will address the issue of the background, how

we got where we are.

But the two critical issues that have arisen, as pointed out by the Chairman, one, the potential threat to Israel, and the other, the possible compromise.

I would like to make it very clear that I have been a strong supporter of defense for Israel. I had a very close relationship when I was Chief of Staff for the Air Force. I was able to work out the early delivery of F-15s to Israel, aircraft that had been part of the United States Air Force.

I have been to Israel twice in the past year. I have personal, close relationships with the leadership of the Israeli military, and I am greatly interested in their having an adequate capability to meet any threat in the ara.

And there is no question in my mind but that the Israelis today can meet any threat, any combination of threats except the Soviet threat, but any combination of threats even by proxies supported by the Soviet Union, and they are in a much better position today then they were in the '60s and the '70s, and we project they will be in good condition to handle any potential threat as far into the future as we can see.

I have been the strongest advocate of AWACS. I testified before this committee for many years. I have used words like "breakthrough," "quantum jump," and I stand by those. AWACS is a very, very good system, and I am pleased

that NATO is procuring the AWACS and that the United States continues to procure the AWACS.

I think there have been some overstatements about what five aircraft can do, particularly when you can only maintain one airplane in orbit continuously, as to what aircraft can do; but that does not in any way impact on my confidence in the AWACS being very, very capable.

Now, the AWACS would be delivered around the end of 1985, but it would be near the end of the decade before the crews would be trained by the Saudis to be able to operate the AWACS according to the schedule that we have worked out on the training. So we will be involved with the AWACS heavily in the training throughout this decade and continuing involvement as far as we can see in the future.

There are no plans that the United States won't have some involvement with the AWACS. We are involved now with the F-5. The F-5s have been there many, many years. We have people there involved clearly with the F-5, with the Hawk missile, with ground radars, we will with the F-15 and certainly with the AWACS.

Now, with regard to any threat to Israel, I think it would be very foolhardy on the part of the Saudis to use in peace or war the AWACS in any way that could be seen as a threat to Israel.

In peace, data-gathering. It is not an intelligence

system, but theoretically it could stay off and look at airplanes flying in Israel. We operated the AWACS for months in Western Europe looking into East Germany and watching the Soviets and the East Germans into Czechoslovakia, and we gained very little knowledge as to what they would do, their tactics, that we didn't already know. And I don't think the Saudis would gain much by trying to look into the west, into Israel.

Another one would be training with other nations such as Syria and Iraq. We would know that, and it takes extensive training to do interoperability and with large numbers with the AWACS. We would know it, and they would be jeopardizing the full support of AWACS, of the F-15s, of the F-5s, of the Hawks, the radars -- our whole support. And if we withdrew that support, their military capability would deteriorate very rapidly. So I would say it would be foolhardy on their part in peacetime to use it either to gather some data or to train with nations with whom we did not agree to their training.

Now, with regard to conflict, first, there is sort of the image that they could control aircraft of many nations. I have pointed out the great problem of doing that without training. To me it would be a very ineffective operation to try to do that without having the adequate training.

First, the Israelis could see the AWACS before the

AWACS could see the Israelis in that passive receivers that could be on hills can see before the energy hits that and bounces back in the sense that not only -- I do not mean in the sense of the speed of light, but there is less power required in the passive receiver, so they could see the AWACS coming before the AWACS crew could see into Israel, and they could do something about it.

If they are up close where they are looking into Israel, then they expose themselves to some jamming. The AWACS is difficult to jam, but the Israelis are very good are jamming; and I am sure the Israelis could counter with jamming and could attack.

Now, I caution as you hear testimony people will talk about the offensive capability of AWACS. Normally that is in the context of looking into the enemy territory, but even in there it is basically a defensive mode of helping your own aircraft to defend themselves against attack by others.

Now, if they are up close looking, the Israelis could destroy the AWACS very easily. People say well, if it is so easy to do it there, how come it is so great in Europe, and why is it not vulnerable in Europe?

First, we have found that with AWACS we get a very great synergistic effect by operating AWACS together and interlinking the two to counter jamming, to provide information for each to help in their defense. The Saudis

would not have a capability to maintain the multiple patrols of Israel.

Secondly, we normally operate well back, over a hundred nautical miles, well back, and in Europe you have many friendly surface-to-air missiles out front, you have many defensive fighters out front, and also it is a very dense air environment which would be extremely difficult to pick the AWACS out of those hundreds and maybe thousands of aircraft which are flying in the area. You do not have the dense traffic in Southwest Asia. So in my judgment it would be extremely foolhardy for them to attempt to use it as a threat against Israel, and the Israelis could counter it.

The Secretary mentioned alternatives and the NIMROD The day before yesterday I visited Manchester, England and went aboard, didn't fly in it but went aboard their breadboard model of the NIMROD AEW aircraft. And I have been somewhat of a skeptic on the NIMROD -- it has been quite a while since I had much information on it -- but I was impressed, very much impressed with the NIMROD.

It is somewhat smaller, the NIMROD aircraft which is an outgrowth of the Comet, then our 707, and therefore has fewer consoles insides; and that may have an impact on the defense environment in Western Europe, but certainly not where there is limited air traffic as in Southwest Asia. And in many areas it is more advanced than the AWACS.

We basically froze the technology on the radar and the system in the AWACS in the early 1970s. This is a new system. So I was very, very impressed.

I think it is in the best interest that they have our AWACS, that we would be involved with them in the AWACS operation, and it would further our relationships with Saudi Arabia to help us in deterring the threat from the Soviet Union.

Now, briefly on the other issue of compromise, certainly we don't want any of our equipment to fall into the hands of the Soviets, whether it is AWACS or whatever the equipment, wherever in the world. And we are working out very tight security arrangements with the Saudis, and they have done very well over the many years, the decades of our operating with them in their country.

But people ask well, what if in the unlikely event it does go into the hands of the Soviets, and it is hard to explain why something that has got such great military worth to us if the Soviets got their hands on that they wouldn't compromise our capability and further their capability.

Reverse engineering is very difficult to do, much more difficult to do than most people think of -- taking a piece of equipment and take it apart, and to then engineer it so that you can build and improve your capability. Some could be done by the Soviets, but as the Secretary pointed out,

they will have a good AWACS before we will have an AWACS operational in Saudi Arabia under this package, and also that our technology was basically frozen for the next part on radar in the early 1970s.

With regard to the integration of the effort -- and that is the most critical part of the AWACS, is the software, the computer taking all of this information and integrating it and displaying it. To try to take that information and to use it someone has equated to unscrambling scrambled eggs.

Now, with regard to the other part, that is, using the information gained in counter our AWACS, particularly in order to improve their electronic counter measures against the AWACS, first the AWACS is difficult to jam just fundamentally because of side lobe suppression and other reasons. And secondly, they could in fact, particularly if we didn't do anything about it. But we're talking about the late '80s, and also the most critical part of it is our computer software, and we can change that computer software and minimize.

And I am not saying that we would not have some concern. We certainly would be concerned if we lost it, but it is not a critical issue. And I submit that if the conditions develop in Saudi Arabia to where the Soviets with the cooperation of the Saudis end up getting our AWACS, one

of the least of the problems of this country will be worrying about the compromise of that technology. The Soviet gain in control and influence in oil and other factors would be much, much greater to us.

The AWACS we are providing is a good system and is adequate to the needs in the region. We are not providing an inferior system in the sense that it will not do the job. They just do not need some of the capability and can go with commercial devices for some of the things such as IFF.

Clearly, to us it is in the best interest of the United States that we provide this package to Saudi Arabia. It is in the best interest of the region to include, in my judgment, Israel, that the U.S. have great influence in Saudi Arabia.

Now, finally, to answer Senator Jackson's question on how we got where we are, and I will give it to the best of my recollection.

Our first involvement with the Saudis on AWACS was in March of '79, as I mentioned, with the conflict between North and South Yemen. We deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia. But I know of no requirement that they raised with regard to their wanting to purchase AWACS, at least to my knowledge, until early I think it was February of 1980.

It was just about a year later that the Soviets made a

request for AWACS, and it was not at our initiative; at least I was not involved in the request for AWACS. And they were told later that spring that, you know, we would need to study the problem, and studies were conducted, and there were meetings between the Ministers of Defense in the summer of 1980 and discussions of the study.

I happened to be on a trip to the Middle East to Oman and Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and Israel and so forth when the war broke out between Iran and Iraq, and when I arrived in Saudi Arabia and war had broken out a few days earlier, there was great worry about the threat to the oil fields in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia. And the Saudis made a request that we deploy some AWACS to Saudi Arabia in order to assist them in the air defense of the eastern region. And I consulted then with Washington, and we were able to get approval, and we very rapidly deployed the four AWACS that are still there.

They did not discuss bringing up with me the purchase of AWACS, except as I was leaving they turned to me and said don't forget our enhancement package; but at that time I did not bring it up, and they did not bring up anything with regard to the sale of AWACS. They were concerned though, and developed shortly thereafter, of the slowness of the U.S. response to their request for the enhancement packages, including AWACS. And I was visiting Turkey in November, and

I was asked to go down and talk to the Saudis and to discuss their concerns and to say to them to help alleviate some of your concerns we will be willing to deliver a few F-15 aircraft earlier than planned. They were desirous of getting an answer, and I told them it was being worked in Washington, and we would try to get an early answer back to them, but I made no commitment as to what that would be.

In late November the Saudis were told by the previous administration that we are favorably disposed to an early and positive decision on the future sale of the AWACS. There were discussions then with representatives of the new Administration. The issue was addressed, particularly in February and in March, and the decision was made at that time and into early April to provide the AWACS to the Saudis; the initiatives were their's.

They knew all along that I would have been very pleased to have our AWACS stay there under the current arrangements and to even do further in the way of our enhancement. But they continually brought up the issue of sovereignty and their need for some air defense capability by themselves.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

Thank you.

Chairman Tower: Thank you, General Jones.

Mr. Secretary, you may present the technical briefing in any way that you see fit.

Secretary Weinberger: Yes. We have a technical briefing by Colonel Stamm which I think will be of interest to the Committee. I think it will take about 15 minutes.

Chairman Tower: Colonel Stamm, you're on.

Lt. Col. Stamm: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. This is a technical briefing on all aspects of the items that are being proposed for sale to the Saudi Arabians. It has particular emphasis on the AWACS, and many of the items that I will be covering have already been discussed here, so I will go over those rather rapidly.

Colonel Stamm: The four items, as you know, are shown here. I would like to draw your attention also, though, to the fact that we are upgrading the ground radar network in Saudi Arabia to, in other words, upgrade their entire air defense capability.

Some of these slides may be familiar, in that some of this literature has been circulated previously. What we are trying to point out, though, is the fact that we are talking about a large piece of geography when we describe the defense of Saudi Arabia.

Here we have it superimposed on the European land mass, and as you can see it basically dwarfs the European land mass. And in Europe we have in U.S. entities alone ten main operating bases, plus NATO operating bases, to defend that amount of air space. And Saudi Arabia will do it from three bases.

Chairman Tower: Colonel, could you suspend for a minute? I think these lights are too bright to see the screen. I wonder if we could douse some of these bright lights so that we can see the screen a little bit better.

Some of them cannot see because you are standing in the way, Colonel.

Colonel Stamm: The point of this slide is that in Saudi Arabia we are defending the same amount of air space from three air bases, one at Dhahran, one at At Ta'if and

one at Qamismisheh. There will be 20 F-15's at each of those bases, and that program starts in January of next year.

The same comparison is made here to the continental United States. The land mass of Saudi Arabia basically covers the same amount of land mass as from the Mississippi River east.

Most of the oil facilities and resources, as you know, are in the area of Dhahran. So if we postulated an attach on Dhahran -- or, pardon me, on those oil facilities -- we can assume that Dhahran will also be struck. In that instance, defense of those oil fields is going to have to come from Ta'if and Qamismisheh. That is quite a piece of geography, much the same as trying to defend Chicago from Wichita or Dallas.

In reality, it is about an hour to an hour and a half flying time, or about three hours round trip, just to and from the contested area. Consequently, we need to do something about the fuel situation for the F-15's. That is where the KC-707 comes into the proposed sale, in that we need to give the F-15's some increased range and endurance to be able to handle that defensive problem.

Additionally with the KC-707, we have refueling pods on the wingtips for probe and drogue type refueling. That would be for the Saudi F-5's. But significantly, that would

be the same system that our U.S. Navy uses and gives us a good bit of interoperability as far as refueling would be concerned in the area.

We are only proposing the sale of six of those, though, with an option to buy two more, which says that in a protracted confrontation, with those limited number of resources, we can expect that the resources will be drawn thin in short order. And we have to give the F-15's some innate capability to do the job on their own.

And that is where the proposal for the conformal fuel tank comes in. The conformal fuel tank increases the internal fuel capacity of the F-15 by about 9,750 pounds and gives them the ability to make the cross-country junket, have some time on cap for defense of that area, and then be able to return to their home base.

The next item in the proposed sale, sir, is the AIM-9L. The AIM-9L is unique in that it has a supercooled seeker head that gives it the ability to launch from the front of the target aircraft. It can see a non-afterburning target from the front quadrant and get that missile off.

This part of the sale is necessary in that we have to do something to optimize the effectiveness of an F-15 against what we postulate as a superior force if they are going to have any hope of defending the oil fields.

First of all, however, and the item that has drawn the

most visibility in the package, if they are going to have any hope whatsoever of defending the oil fields, they are going to have to see the threat in time to defend against it, and that is where the AWACS proposal comes from.

The AWACS is basically, as you know, a KC-707 that has been heavily modified: a 30-foot rotodome that is in fact six feet thick, has 141-type engines on it, the same as we have on our C-141 type aircraft, and a refueling receptacle.

As I mentioned, though, we are proposing upgrading the entire air defense network in Saudi Arabia. Presently they have five Marconi British-built antequated radars, tube-type technology, that give them very little if any coverage in the area. Consequently we are proposing the upgrade of the ground system, some sort of generic message-processing capability to link the entire system together, with the AWACS superimposed on top of it.

This arrangement was derived after an extensive study done by the U.S. Government and is determined as the best way to address their problem. The thing that is effective in this as far as we are concerned, though, is it then gives us the ability to link with U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf, Navy E2-C's when they come within range, as well as Task Force 70 out in the Arabian Sea. That gives us an immediate crisis capability in the area and is something highly

desirable.

Some specifics on the aircraft: Orbiting altitude is 29,000 feet. That is the altitude that the aircraft is optimized for. If we deviate from that significantly we will degrade the radar, degrade endurance, and it just obviously is the best place to be with the airplane.

Endurance, 9 to 11 hours depending on where you are operating, 22 hours if we augment and refuel the aircraft. 17 total people on board. Most significantly, though, and something that has been confused for some time on this aircraft, is that it has no UINT or SIGINT capability whatsoever. There is no equipment on board for that function. It was designed on a concept to defend the North American continent in the mid-60's. Consequently there was no need for that type of equipment to fit that mission.

Very rapidly, some radar principles, just to describe the operation, so that I can get to some limitations. With a ground-based radar we simply emanate energy and look at whatever bounces, reflects energy back to our antenna, and interpret that on a scope to tell us what's inbound in the way of an aircraft.

Limitations on that. Since it is ground-based, we're limited by the curvature of the earth, as well as terrain. Consequently, at 60 miles an aircraft below 6,000 feet -- 10,000 feet -- will not be seen. At 17 miles an aircraft

below 300 feet will not be seen. At 13 miles an aircraft below 100 feet will not be seen. So there are some definite limitations. Additionally, any aircraft that is using terrain masking, flying behind mountains or behind ridge lines, will not be seen whatsoever.

If we put that ground radar out here, due to that curvature of the earth that I spoke to, we are limited to about 20 or 30 miles of capability. What we have done with the AWACS is elevated it to about 30,000 feet, and we have changed our radar line of sight to about 208 miles, out at the radar horizon.

When we elevate that radar and emanate energy at the ground with the normal radar, we will get so much reflected energy that we will not see anything for all the ground return. So we have gone to a Pulse Doppler, which looks at the reflected energy for a shift in frequency caused when it hits a high-speed moving target. In other words, this system is optimized only for high-speed targets, and in Pulse Doppler all we look for is movement. Consequently, we will not see anything on the ground that is not moving fast enough to trigger that frequency shift.

Another limitation on radar is the size of whatever it is that I am reflecting off of. With an AWACS, a small size target will not be seen beyond about 175 miles just due to the reflective size of that target. A medium-sized target

is about 240. And finally, a large-sized target, out at about 360 miles. That is dependent, of course, on whether I am looking at it on the nose, what amount of reflective angle I have.

We have one additional capability that is a maritime mode, in that we can look at ships in the ocean, and the way we do that is that we can emanate pure pulse energy, not looking for movement, just pure pulse energy at a body of water. Water absorbs more energy than ground. Consequently, the software can sort out a ship on the water if it is of sufficient size and the water is calm enough.

One last point: Anything out beyond that radar horizon, radar line of sight, will not be seen at low level.

A quick summary, then: We can see low-level aircraft, but we do not see them beyond 200 miles. In Doppler we can see high-speed targets, but we do not see tanks, troops or ground targets. In maritime mode we can see ships at sea, but even on the desert we get too much reflected energy to see those types of items.

Radar-jamming is seen on the scope as a dotted line, but we have no capability to jam ourselves. We do have a command and control capability on the aircraft, but once again no intelligence-gathering capability.

The need for this system in Saudi Arabia is easily

pointed out if we take a quick look at the time and distance situation we face. With a ground-based radar, as I mentioned earlier, due to the curvature of the earth we are limited to about 20 or 30 miles detection. I can put 100 radars in there and never improve that capability. Consequently, a low-level inbound threat will not be seen until that point.

If he is at 400 to 600 knots, which he certainly will be, he has about two to four minutes, the normal figure that is used, until he gets to the oil fields at Dhahran. If he is seen at that point and identified as a threat and all the command and control functions are carried out, it is going to take at least a minute or two to do that; scramble the fighters, that takes about five minutes. At that six or seven minute-point, the threat will have been in, hit the oil fields, and already be on his way home.

If I superimpose the AWACS on that same situation and use that 200 miles of low-level detection range that I spoke to earlier, I can orbit well back and still have adequate range to see the target in time to go through the command and control functions, scramble my aircraft, and at that six or seven-minute point the threat will still be 80 or 90 miles out. Intercept at this point takes place about 40 or 50 miles from the target.

An added point is that a low-level threat can underfly

the Hawk radar that we might put around the oil fields as well as it could the ground radar, and they would not see the threat in time to react to it also. So we need that AWACS even interlinked with the Hawk's to make them effective.

Looking at the problem from a different angle, this circle represents the low level coverage of the AWACS, about 210 miles, with the AWACS at the center. If we orbited in the area we are talking about, the area of the oil fields, we get coverage all the way out to the Zagros Mountains, and in this defensive mode have adequate capability with our radios and with our look, to see the threat and defend ourselves from any inbound threat.

I would like to point out that we are in fact retracted from the threat at this point. However, if we project it into the northernmost corner of the area to try and take a look at the land mass of Israel, you can see that we have to get to that point to have any hope of in fact getting a look into Israeli.

In reality, there are mountains down the east coast that preclude a complete look at that point, and I will talk to that in a bit. But the point is that once I get it up there I have a very large aircraft that is easily seen on radar. It emits massive amounts of energy, so that its signature is very easily determined. And it becomes, first

of all, very easily seen so that it cannot collect intelligence covertly; secondly, very vulnerable since it is without defense in that position.

Just a quick look. This is a computer-generated line of sight projection of what would be seen off the AWACS up in that notch. These blank areas here are the masking or the shadows caused by the mountains. Those areas would not in fact be seen. Purple dots represent the Israeli air bases. So at least half the Israeli air bases would be masked even in that furthestmost projection.

Another possibility would be to put it down to the south, but then I do not get full coverage to the north. Additionally, I am orbiting within sight of one of the main operating bases and that would hardly be the tactical place to put that aircraft.

Significantly, if I withdraw from that point there about 50 miles, then the masking becomes extremely significant and blanks out the entire country.

I asked the computer how far forward I would have to go to see the entire land mass of Israel, and this is a point over Jordan, about Amman.

Already been alluded to, but I will cover it one more time, the possibility of an AWACS being used in a consolidated attack against Israel is really a difficult situation, as General Jones pointed out, in that none of the

down-link equipment would be provided. Consequently they would be limited to voice-only type equipment, UHF or HF.

Additionally, they have problems in that most of the Arab nations do not possess aircraft with compatible radios or IFF, so they would be doing that without those type items. Even if they did have this down-link equipment, though, they still would not have the software that would make this program work.

But even if those communications problems were solved for them, they would still be faced with the problem that has given us the most problem at this point, and that is, as he pointed out, trying to orchestrate this entire battle with people from various nations, different dialects, different procedures, different types of aircraft. And trying to put that whole ball of wax together and employ it is extremely difficult and in fact impossible without extensive training.

The fact is that we are going to be in country with that weapons system throughout the life cycle. There is no way that that could take place without us knowing about it.

Technology transfer concerns have already been spoken to, but very briefly, in technology transfer we are talking about two items, as I see it. One is the hardware involved, the other are the techniques embedded in the hardware.

The hardware itself, as General Jones pointed out, was

frozen on a concept developed in the mid-60's. In 1972 it was frozen with off the shelf hardware from that point. Development went through delivery of the aircraft in '77. So we are in fact talking about technology that is of an earlier stage. That does not degrade it, of course, because we do have a working system on board. It does say, however, that that technology level does exist in many other nations in the world.

As far as the techniques that are embedded in that software, that is the situation where we get into if it were compromised we would in fact be able to modify the software and in fact have a system that would once again be jam-resistant.

AWACS delivery will not take place until 1985. There are program systems in other areas, such as the Soviets expecting to have one on line well in advance of that delivery. Security arrangements will be extensive in country prior to that technology being placed in Saudi Arabia.

A quick look at the configuration. The joint tactical information distribution system is a jam-resistant, secure type communication system that will not be delivered. Additionally, additional consoles and radios will not be delivered. I point out those two items in that that is the area that would give them jam-resistance, and in a defensive

mode it becomes very insignificant in that you are drawn back from the proximity of the jammer.

If I want to use that aicraft offensively, I would have to project it forward or project my fighters forward, and then the jammer becomes significant. So with those items removed from the aircraft, it is in fact defensive and effective as a defensive mechanism, but ineffective as an offensive weapon.

This slide represents the contractor manning levels expected with the system throughout its life cycle, and in fact points out the umbilical cord that we have spoken to with the system. I say this with some assurance, then, that we intend to have contractor manning with the U.S. Air Force AWACS throughout its life cycle. Consequently, there are areas within the Saudi program that they would never be trained up to and will in fact be dependent on contractor manning throughout that life cycle.

This represents the Peace Hawk or the F-5 program, decline in contractor manning. Peace Sun is probably not going to be quite as steep a decline, but I would expect it to level off; AWACS, probably even further.

What I am pointing out is that hard core of technicians and engineers with the system will remain with the system throughout its life cycle. If it is used contrary to our desires at any point, of course, we can pull that plug and

shut the system off in short order.

In summary, then, what we have looked at basically is the fact that we are proposing an upgrade of the entire air defense capability of Saudi Arabia, but more significantly, what we are looking at is the facilities, the prepositioned or, I might add, prepaid spares, supplies and maintenance that will be placed in country that we can use with our weapons systems, such as F-15's and AWACS, if we intend to be able to employ them in those areas for extended periods of time.

Interoperability with the U.S. Navy was spoken to in terms of the immediate crisis capability we would have in the area with this situation. Joint operations with the U.S. Air Force were proposed and will be an ongoing thing if this sale were to be consummated. Data sharing is a natural outcome of this arrangement.

Finally, the fact that we would be in country, being able to improve the security on our vital oil interests and have an established presence in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East is of most interest to us.

That completes the briefing.

Chairman Tower: Thank you, Colonel.

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. Chairman, that completes our presentation. And General Kelley, who had until very recently the command of the Rapid Deployment Force, one of

whose primary missions would be in this area, and General Jones and I are at your disposal and will be glad to try to take your questions.

Chairman Tower: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Let me simply remind my colleagues on the Committee that the foreign policy and geopolitical aspects of this issue will be dealt with fully by the Foreign Relations Committee, which does have jurisdiction over the resolution of disapproval. It is our function to concentrate on the military, the technical and geostrategic aspects of the issue. And I would suggest that our questions be guided accordingly.

Senator Jackson?

Senator Jackson: Is General Kelley going to make a statement?

Chairman Tower: General Kelley is there as a backup man. If anybody wants to address a question to General Kelley, he certainly may.

And I might say, General, you should feel free to comment if you choose to.

General Kelley: Thank you, sir.

Senator Jackson: Mr. Chairman, I have been a little bit amused in listening to this briefing. I do not know, I got the impression, Mr. Secretary, that this is a pile of junk.

Secretary Weinberger: You should not have that impression, Senator. It is a very good airplane.

Senator Jackson: Well, I am familiar with it, having defended it. And Senator Cannon and I were just talking here a moment ago. This is not the kind of briefing that was done when the appropriations were up and the authorization was up, clearly.

You know, I am just a country boy, but I read all through this that this is just another system, that it does not mean much, that it is not important.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, you should not have that impression.

Senator Jackson: Well, the Colonel certainly led one to that belief, that this is not a highly sophisticated system, that if it fell into the hands of the Soviets that they would not gain much anyway. I have never seen such a downgrading of this system. In fact, I am just appalled by the briefing, to be very candid about it.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, you should not have the impression that there is anything lacking in value in this plane. It is a very valuable addition. And my statement and General Jones' statement is replete with the importance of the necessity of the Saudi Government having it.

There has been a great deal of misinformation in the

last few weeks put out to the effect that, should this plane fall into the hands of the Soviets, our entire defensive capability would somehow collapse. And what we are trying to do is deal with that kind of miinformation.

It is a very valuable, very useful, very versatile plane. It is vital for the Saudis to have it. And all we are saying is that the Soviets have very similar kinds of technology and that there are safeguards that we take, as with all of our sophisticated equipment, to try to guard against that. And we are perfectly satisfied that the Saudi Government would be able to protect that, and we mentioned that they have protected other highly sophisticated equipment which has been sold to them in the past.

There is nothing that is in any way inadequate about the plane. But it is, in the view of a lot of exaggerations that have been bandied about in the last few weeks, important to point out that the plane does have some limitations and to point out exactly what it would do.

When some of our visitors were here recently, we had to counter an impression that the AWACS was able to look into one of the hotels in Israel and report on everything that was happening there. And the simple fact of the matter is that, as you know, unless that hotel is moving at 65 knots an hour along the ground, you cannot do that. But that is what the purpose of this briefing is, is to put some facts

before the Committee.

Senator Jackson: But you agree that it is relevant, of course, to take a look and see what the security situation is in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Weinberger: Of course.

Senator Jackson: I am sure that the President has taken that position. As a matter of fact, may I just read what the President said in an article in the "Washington Post" on August 15, 1979, at the very time that General Jones referred to the concern about the need for this aircraft.

"The fall of Iran" -- I am quoting now -- "has increased Israel's value is perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely. Other pro-western states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf kingdoms, are weak and vulnerable."

Secretary Weinberger: And it is for that reason that we want to add to their strength.

Senator Jackson: Well, let me ask you specifically, what capability do the Saudis have right now of manning and operating this aircraft?

Secretary Weinberger: I think it would require an American presence for some time to assist in the training, assist particularly in the ground maintenance and the ground

control and ground collection aspects of the operation. I think that it is 1985 before the plane itself would be delivered, as you know, and it would be some time after that -- I do not have a specific estimate, but some years after that -- while both training and certainly maintenance and ground operations conducted by U.S. personnel would I think be required.

Senator Jackson: Do you not agree, Mr. Secretary, that the situation in Saudi Arabia really is fragile from a political point of view? The Mecca incident is fresh in our minds, and certainly we on this side of the process have a responsibility to look at that. And Mecca was a complete surprise to our people and a complete surprise to them.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator Jackson, there is no question that Mecca was a surprise and a disagreeable incident. But it was an incident. We have, I think it is fair to say, complete confidence in the stability and soundness of the Saudi Arabian Government. They have been very careful to avoid the problems which beset Iran, which was allowing the civilian government, so to speak, to move so far away from what the religious leaders wanted and had in mind, and to do the modernization that has been done in Saudi Arabia.

All of that has been done in very close coordination with the religious leaders, and you do not have that kind of

a split that was very prevalent in Iran. I have no hesitancy in advising the Committee that in my opinion, based on the information before us, Saudi Arabia has a very stable, very solid government.

We have incidents at home that we regard as very difficult and unfortunate. There are incidents in Germany. There are incidents all over the world. But the simple fact of the matter is --

Senator Jackson: But Mr. Secretary, you are not really seriously comparing the internal situation in Saudi Arabia with the United States?

Secretary Weinberger: No, sir, I am not. I am saying your pointing out of a single incident in Mecca is not a fair basis for challenging the stability of Saudi Arabia.

Senator Jackson: But is it not a fact that our security people for a long time -- and I have served on the Intelligence Committee for some time, and I am not going to get into those details. But clearly we have had a serious concern about what might happen in Saudi Arabia.

Secretary Weinberger: I think --

Senator Jackson: I am just saying here that Mr. Reagan certainly was of that view in 1979.

Secretary Weinberger: He felt and feels now that the capabilities, the defensive capabilities of Saudi Arabia, have to be strengthened. And I think this plane will

clearly do that. I think that is why it is so vital.

Senator Jackson: No one disputes that. The question really gets down to the management of this system. And AWACS in NATO is under SAC, is it not?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson: Well, that is an American officer. And why is it, other than an ego trip, do the Saudis want to have total control? This is the whole debate up here?

Secretary Weinberger: No, sir, it is far more than an ego trip. It is the simple matter of the sovereignty of a very proud and able nation, and it is an extremely important thing that that nation remain, in my opinion, in very close and friendly relationships with the United States.

Senator Jackson: But what capability --

Secretary Weinberger: May I just finish?

I think that would be destroyed if this resolution of disapproval should be approved. It would be a clear signal that the Saudis could not rely on the United States or the American President to make the kind of foreign policy that is required and was recommended strongly by prior Administrations.

And General Jones has a point that I think should be made.

Senator Jackson: Let me just get on this point here. My time is limited.

Senator Humphrey: That is right.

Senator Jackson: Let me just ask this fundamental question. Here you have the AWACS system. You see all these planes coming. What capability, realistically now, would the Saudis have of intercepting enemy aircraft?

Secretary Weinberger: I think the capability is one that we have assisted with. They have a good, strong air force of their own and we believe that that air force needs strengthening and this is one of the ways in that could be done.

Senator Jackson: Let me just say can they do it right now in this foreseeable period without American help?

Secretary Weinberger: I think right now they and many other countries would need American help.

Senator Jackson: Would the Israelis need it?

Secretary Weinberger: I think they would, yes, sir.

Senator Jackson: How do you classify, General Jones, the Israeli air force with the Saudi air force?

Secretary Weinberger: It is clearly superior.

General Jones: The Israeli air force now, in the past, and as far as we could see into the future, certainly this century and well beyond that, the Israeli air force will be far superior to the Saudi air force.

Senator Jackson: How would you rank the Saudi air force?

General Jones: It is a very small air force.

Senator Jackson: Quality-wise?

General Jones: They are doing quite well with their F-5s. I have been quite impressed with the capability of the F-5s. It is a small air force. They do quite well, not anywhere near as well as the Israelis.

Senator Jackson: How about the Egyptians right across the border? Where do you rate them? That is what I want to know.

General Jones: Senator, I'm not going to get into rating Saudi Arabian air force versus Egyptian air force. The Egyptian air force has a lot of old Soviet equipment. It is larger.

Senator Jackson: The Syrian air force?

General Jones: The Syrian air force is better. It's larger.

Senator Jackson: Who are they superior to out there?

General Jones: I think to Oman, to --

Senator Jackson: Oman?

General Jones: I'm not talking about a threat.

Senator Jackson: Nobody.

General Jones: Senator, let's get realistic about this. If you are talking about a major attack on Saudi

Arabia by major air force elements, wherever they come from, five AWACS with one up and a handfull of F-15s is not going to be able to defend the whole kingdom. And, therefore, we anticipate working with them. We have ships in the Gulf that have radars. We have ships outside the straits of Hormuz with fighter aircraft.

There is no intent for Saudi Arabia to be able to defend itself against any threat of any major size. It will give them a substantial capability.

I have two additional points. One is I share your concern on the briefing because it tends to say why it is not a threat to the Israelis and I concur it is not a threat to the Israelis. But as I said before, it was a major breakthrough. It has tremendous capability now and I continue to be a strong advocate of AWACS procurement for the United States Air Force as well as for others.

With regard to NATO it is a different situation with NATO. Number one, we pay for a good, substantial portion of those aircraft. But, more importantly, we have an alliance with the NATO nations and we have said to them in that alliance that if you are attacked it is as though the United States were attacked and we will come to your assistance.

We do not have a treaty of that regard with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, they don't know under what conditions we would come to assist them and, therefore, they have a right

to have a sovereign capability of a limited nature.

Senator Jackson: But all AWACS planes all over are under American command and control, even today in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman Tower: Senator Jackson, your time is up. I think we will have an opportunity to come back.

General Jones: I might say there are E-2Cs which have much of the capability of the AWACS which are in the hands of other nations that we have no control or influence over their operation.

Senator Jackson: AWACS I am talking about.

Chairman Tower: Senator Humphrey?

General Jones: Airborne or otherwise.

Senator Humphrey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen.

I want to say at the outset that I am not committed one way or another on this issue. I want to hear all of the evidence on both sides of the question, but I do have some concerns and if I probe you it is not because I have taken one point of view or another but that I want to ferret out some information.

One of my concerns is what will be the next slice of the salami. As you know, in 1978 the F-15 package was sold on the basis that there would be no attempt to enhance the later on. And, of course, now we are looking at

enhancement. The whole AWACS package, including the F-15s and the ground radar are being sold on the basis of defense -- air defense -- and yet we know that the Saudis very much want, in addition to what we are proposing or the Administration is proposing to give them, multiple injection bombers, which I think would undoubtedly turn that airplane from an air defense role to an offense role, unless they are planning to bomb MIGs in mid-air, which I realize they are not.

So I am worried about what the next slice of the salami will be and where should we look for reassurance that the next slice won't be after this AWACS thing, the whole package which has come to be known as AWACS is digested. What is going to be the next slice of the salami?

Secretary Weinberger: I don't know of any other pending request or any possible future requests, Senator.

I would call your attention to the enormous changes that have occurred in the whole region since the 1978 sale. Afghanistan has been invaded. Iran has fallen. Iran and Iraq are at war. Ethiopia and Yemen have become virtually client states of the Soviets and Libya has enormously increased both its capabilities and its aggressiveness. And the entire region has become a far more volatile tinderbox even than it was before.

And so I think this is a vitally-needed strenghtening

of the Saudi capability, that the Saudis have been and can be a major force for moderation and for working with us for the protection of the whole region, and the whole region specifically includes Israel.

General Jones: Senator, may I just add? They did request bomb racks. We have told them that we have not approved those and we have told them that we recognize they have a legitimate concern to cope with an invasion of Saudi Arabia and we would be willing to study with them the problem of coping with an invasion of Saudi Arabia and address the various ways to help cope with that.

Senator Humphrey: Well, to be sure, things have changed in that part of the world, but I worry very much about that.

The matter of the AIM-9L, that is a very valuable asset. Do the Soviets have anything like that? How serious would it be if that missile fell into the hands our aversaries, that model?

Secretary Weinberger: I think they do not have anything as good as that. I think General Jones explained and discussed the difficulties of their being able to duplicate it. They have the technology. They know the ways in which the heat-seeking missile operates and its guidance system. I don't think they have anything of that kind specifically.

General Jones?

General Jones: The AIM-9L, Senator Humphrey, is in the hands of a number of friends and allies and we even have co-production. That is a more sensitive issue that you get into -- how you co-produce as opposed to just getting your hands on the equipment. We do not want the AIM-9L to fall to Soviet hands as we don't want our other equipment to fall into their hands.

Senator Humphrey: Well, I have had some of our Air Force people tell me that they think this is the most critical part of the package, that if this technology fell into the hands of our adversaries it would pretty much wipe out our edge in fighter superiority.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, it is a very important capability. I don't think that we can be guided in our sales of military equipment to our friends by constantly worrying as to whether or not it is going to fall into enemy hands.

We had a great deal of our equipment fall into enemy hands in Vietnam. We have to recognize, I think, in the sales of military equipment that we are enhancing the security of the United States and helping to defend the United States whenever they are made. And that is one of the reasons why they are quite properly referred to the Congress in many cases.

But we do make sales to a large number of countries. We cannot in each case worry about whether that country is going to be able to safeguard the equipment. It is not just the stability of the country. All kinds of agents and other people are involved in operating and you can never be sure when either we operate anything here at home or when we sell it to any of the people to whom we consider it most important in helping our policy that it may or may not be lost. A lot of our technological secrets have been lost right here at home. And none of it is something that should be either encouraged or that we shouldn't make every effort to work against.

But you do have the AIM-9L which adds a very strong military capability to the Saudis, the ability to attack an incoming fighter going over the oil fields head-on without the necessity of trying to maneuver around behind it and all of the rest. And so I don't have any doubt that it's an important and necessary addition to their arsenal.

I do worry, as we all do about everything that is transferred to any country and we take all the precautions that we can to try to avoid that, as we do at home, too.

General Jones: Senator, briefly on this, I talked to some people who had the same concern on the AIM-9L technology, particularly the heat-seeking portion. And when I delve into their concerns it is we lose it to the

Soviets. They immediately have the capability and, therefore, we lose our advantage.

We have got to recognize it will be a few years before the Saudis have the AIM-9L. If the Soviets got their hands on it they would have great problems of the reverse engineering. It would take considerable time to try to build it.

We estimate within this time period they will have a better missile with many of the characteristics of the AIM-9L and we are working on even more improved missiles that we can have out at the end of this decade.

Senator Humphrey: Well, the matter, of course, if Saudi Arabia is successfully invaded of actual weapons falling into the hands of our adversaries, such as that they would be able to use them against us. So that doesn't dismiss the argument that it would be some years before the Soviets could figure it out and use it themselves, the danger of these weapons falling into the hands of our adversaries.

General Jones: Well, we have seen in Iran the great difficulty of the Iraqis.

Senator Humphrey: The Soviet Union is a great deal more sophisticated than either Iran or Vietnam.

General Jones: That's true, but the Iranians have some very good capability that they have not been able to use --

for example, the Phoenix missile -- as we expected they might be able to do.

Senator Humphrey: Yes, but we are talking about different countries. Let me move on to something else and come back to this later, if I may.

Why not, if the Saudis are looking for greater air defense, that is the area that would be in our best interest if they upgrade their air defenses. Why not rely more heavily on ground-to-air missiles in conjunction with some kind of AWACS, whether it is E-2 or E-3? Why do we have to upgrade these F-15 fighters such that without too much difficulty they could become offensive weapons? Why not, instead, encourage them to rely more heavily on ground-to-air missiles in conjunction with an airborne radar platform?

General Jones: They are increasing their capability with HAWKs, but if you look at the deployment on the eastern shore an aircraft coming in at low altitude, it comes into the HAWK range in a very short period.

Senator Humphrey: Are you talking about HAWK range in conjunction with AWACS or with the ground radar?

General Jones: You cannot use a HAWK until it comes within radar range of the HAWK. You can tell the HAWK it is coming, but the HAWK has to lock on itself and so at very lot altitude you get very short range with a HAWK missile

and the HAWK will be a good complementary part of it.

But if they came in at extremely low altitudes the HAWk would lock on about the time they got right in very close to the oil fields.

Secretary Weinberger: The AWACS, Senator, I think the quickest way to put it, adds something like two to four hours to the two-to-four minutes that now exists and that is an enormously important advantage in that region.

Senator Humphrey: Let me come back to that question as well. I want to explore that further.

The matter of the security of the AWACS software, the Administration contends that the codes can be reciphered and that would render the software of little value to our adversaries. I know a little about computers and programs, not a great deal, frankly, but a little, and is it not the programs themselves, the algorithms that are of value. And by simply deciphering, rechanging or reciphering, changing the ciphers you don't in any way destroy the program itself, do you? I don't know what kind of a setup you have, but I am concerned about the security of the programs themselves.

General Jones: Senator, first, much of the most sensitive information is put into this system on construction. It is not even made available to the U.S. Air Force in the sense of the units or NATO or the rest. They don't need it in the basic design of the system.

Secondly, when I talk to them, and I'm not a computer expert. I've got some experience. But to try to do that backwards, of trying to decipher what it is is much less of a problem than our making fundamental changes in the system in a shorter period of time.

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if at this point in the record, in response to Senator Humphrey's question, if I could put in a two-page paper which goes into substantial technical detail both about algorithms and the other points he has raised that might be useful as part of our answer to this question.

Chairman Tower: It will be placed in the record as a part of the answer to your question.

[COMMITTEE INSERT.]

Senator Humphrey: My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Senator Cannon?

Senator Cannon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us a little more specifically about what the agreement is. We have seen the proposals as to what is to be delivered. I would like to know a little more precisely about what controls are to be retained and what are not to be retained from the standpoint of people and training.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, I can't really go into any full detail about that. There are a number of different safeguards that are standard to the transfer of this equipment, this type of the equipment, the high technology equipment. Those are all incorporated.

General Jones can certainly go into detail about those. There have been a lot of discussions about other types of arrangements, but I do not have before me at this time any kind of detailed knowledge of those. Many of those discussions are continuing.

But the standard clauses in these contracts are the same clauses that are in a lot of the equipment that we transferred to Israel and would also be included in these contracts.

Senator Cannon: I understand that. You would have the

standard clauses about non-transfer of technology and all this sort of thing.

What I am really talking about is the operational control. We have four AWACS down there now. They are under our operational control, as I understand it, are they not, General?

General Jones: Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon: And are there some Saudis on board now? Give us the mix. You have got people there.

General Jones: Today we are there at the request of the Saudi government, working in an eastern region helping with the air defense and are linked in. A Saudi officer flies abcard our AWACS, normally, I think, on every flight. There may have been some flights that he has not been aboard. He is not a member of the crew, not a member of control. The basic system of control is by us.

As we look to the future in the program we do sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia. They take control of the aircraft from an ownership standpoint. It will take many years while we work cooperatively in training, I think longer than projected, because in most cases we have found that it takes longer than we estimate to bring our own units up to operational readiness.

For the life of the contract we will have contractors there. Furthermore, we will have the security agreement

that is very stringent and we will have inspections to determine that those security agreements were followed. They cannot pass information to a third country, they cannot have third country nationals work on the aircraft, in either case without our approval.

These are the types of controls that we would have.

Senator Cannon: And when would we actually lose effective control of the aircraft -- command and control responsibility?

Secretary Weinberger: Very hard to estimate that. They would be delivered in 1985. Everyone I have talked to is in full agreement that a training capability of an indefinite time would be required because it is a complex machine and there would likely be a period of American maintenance and work with respect to the ground installations for several years thereafter.

So I think you are well into the '90s, but I do not have any definite date.

General Jones: Senator, we would have involvement, particularly in support, ad infinitum. At some point -- I think it will be 1990 -- they could say Americans get lost and we will go operate the airplane. And their capability would deteriorate very rapidly without our technical support, both our people and our spares and the other inputs to the AWACS.

So you have, in that way, very great influence and a deterrent on their not using the aircraft in a way that is inimical to our interests. It is not direct control but it is great influence on it and it would be foolhardy for them to go ahead and move our people out and say we're going to do what we want regardless of what you say. And they would deteriorate very rapidly and their other military capability would deteriorate rapidly.

Senator Cannon: Where does the real problem arise? Isn't it the problem of where we lose control of that aircraft so that we do not exercise command and control over it? Isn't that what the Israelis are concerned about?

General Jones: Personally I don't know where the problem, is, Senator, because I think it is one more of image than of fact.

Senator Cannon: Well, I do not know what the problem is after this briefing and, frankly, I do not know why they are concerned at all. If what you say is correct, I would like to ask you why you think the Israelis opposed this kind of a proposal.

General Jones: I don't know. I was surprised when they became so opposed to it. They had not expressed concerns earlier.

Senator Cannon: You mean they haven't expressed to you what their concerns were?

General Jones: Earlier. I say it was a surprise when they came out with their strong concerns about security. I do not see it as a threat to Israel. I think it is in their best interests.

Senator Cannon: Well, I must say that my strong concern is that of security and I went through this exercise in trying to defend the AWACS over a period of several years. I must say had I heard this briefing that I heard today and that I have heard in the past few days I would have been a little less enthusiastic about my support because I didn't know that I was going so strong in supporting a system that was of such little importance.

General Jones: Senator, as I stated earlier I share some of your concerns in clearly demonstrating that it is not a threat to Israel. Other aspects of the capability, particularly in Europe and other parts of the world, are not pointed out in an adequate form.

I am the strongest advocate of AWACS and AWACS is very, very good. But five aircraft in the hands of the Saudis, heavily dependent on us for technical assistance, contractor assistance and spares, their taking those off and trying to do something with them against Israel is a very limited capability that would deteriorate very rapidly.

That doesn't mean the AWACS, properly supported, properly operated, fully equipped, isn't a great system,

even in a dense environment of western Europe.

Senator Cannon: What is proposed or what is envisioned to take place in the period of now to 1985 when those five are supposedly to be delivered? Do our four remain down there under our command and control?

General Jones: No, sir. These are new production. They come off the production line.

Senator Cannon: No, I said do our four remain down there in the interim period under our command and control and operational control, during all that period up to 1985?

Secretary Weinberger: If the Saudis wish that, yes, sir.

Senator Cannon: Pardon.

Secretary Weinberger: If the Saudis wish that that would be the case.

Senator Cannon: Well, we certainly ought to know by now with all of these negotiations whether they wish it or whether they don't.

Secretary Weinberger: They have indicated nothing at all to us or to me that indicates that they do not want them to stay. So I cannot say to you right now, Senator, that yes, I guarantee they will be there for five years. All I can say is that they wanted them very much earlier and there hasn't been the slightest indication that they do not wish them now.

General Jones: Senator, I clearly anticipate that they will stay there. Every indication we have had from them is that they will stay there even beyond the delivery of their aircraft, in that they won't become operational for a considerable period of time.

And until they become operational they are very worried about the threat to the oil fields and, therefore, we would stay, I anticipate, beyond 1985. And I do not foreclose some operation beyond that, because there are other areas, as you saw, down around to the south of there that we could be of some assistance in our operations of AWACS in the area.

So I clearly anticipate to, well, late in the '80s, our presence there.

Senator Cannon: Do they have crews on those airplanes now in a training status?

General Jones: No, sir.

Senator Cannon: None at all?

General Jones: They generally have one officer aboard observing, maybe, some limited training he gets out of observing. But he is not operating equipment as such. We do have a training program that will start a little before the delivery of the first aircraft, a training program here in the United States.

Senator Cannon: Are we reimbursed for the keeping of the four AWACS down there now?

General Jones: No, sir.

Senator Cannon: Pardon?

General Jones: No, sir. They are paying for the crews and providing for facilities and a lot of other things.

Senator Cannon: You say paying for the crews? You mean they are paying the salaries of our military personnel?

General Jones: No, sir. They are not paying their salaries, but to the best of my knowledge they are providing support, where people live and that, but they are not paying for those aircraft being there, no.

Senator Cannon: Thank you, General. My time is up.

Chairman Tower: Senator Cohen?

Senator Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Stamm, could you stand up for a moment? I think you indicated when you were standing at the board that if the AWACS were moved up into the northern tier they would be very exposed, you said, without defense in that position.

You do not mean to say those planes fly without defense?

Colonel Stamm: It is a completely defenseless system.

Senator Cohen: No F-15s will be flying with the AWACS?

Colonel Stamm: I was saying you could put a defense cap up with them.

Senator Cohen: You mean to say even down in the south toward the oil fields they will be flying without a defensive system? Don't they always fly with a defensive

system?

Colonel Stamm: The aircraft we have over there right now do not fly with a defensive system. What we do is we keep them drawn back 125 to 150 miles so that they have adequate warning. They can see all the way out 200 miles.

Senator Cohen: But if you put them up north with some F-15s they would not be as naked and exposed as you suggest.

Colonel Stamm: It I put them up north -- may I put my slide back up?

Senator Cohen: No.

Colonel Stamm: If I'm withdrawn from the threat area I get the full limit of my own protection and coverage to see the threat emanate, determine what it is, and take a response to it before it becomes a situation that I cannot escape from.

If I project it forward, looking into Israel, I have to project it so far forward that I've given up a good bit of that low-level coverage.

Senator Cohen: Could you put a few SAM missiles around the northern border?

Colonel Stamm: Saudi SAM missiles?

Senator Cohen: Sure. Is that a very difficult thing to do? For example, in Lebanon we have seen missiles lined up along the border. Would it be very difficult for the Saudis, who are not lacking in funds, certainly, to place

some missiles along their border saying they need this kind of a defensive system to prevent possible attacks from right to left on the border?

Colonel Stamm: The problem is bigger than that. The aircraft that will be delivered to Saudi Arabia will not have jam-resistant equipment to transmit that warning to the SAMs on board. Consequently, even if those Saudis did get up there and see the threat emanate, if they were jammed at the same time they wouldn't be able to transmit that information to the SAMs and, in fact, effect a good defense. That also includes any F-15 fighters that they might put up there in conjunction with the SAMs and the AWACS.

Senator Cohen: Mr. Secretary, could I just follow up on Senator Jackson's questions? I think you indicated that all the AWACS we currently have with our allies in NATO were under joint or under U.S. control. And I think you responded there reason there's a distinction here is that Saudi Arabia is a sovereign, proud nation and that we are committed to defending Saudi Arabia if it were attacked.

If the President of the United States, supported by the Congress, were to indicate that we think it is in our vital interest to defend the Persian Gulf and have in fact earmarked a rapid deployment force to carry out that mission of defending the Persian Gulf, would that not be an

indication that we intend to put as much support as we do to our NATO allies to defend the government of Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Weinberger: I don't think automatically, Senator, no. You have to look at each situation on its face and the way it is at the moment that you are examining it.

We have, with NATO, not only treaties but we have joint operations provided from the beginning. The present Supreme Commander in Europe is an American, so you can say that the AWACS that will be assigned to NATO will be under American direction. But they are actually under joint direction of the NATO organization, of which he is a representative.

Senator Cohen: Is it fair to say that we would defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack?

Secretary Weinberger: I hope so. I think it is vital to our interests to do so. Yes, I certainly hope so.

Senator Cohen: And I agree with that.

I want to read a statement to you, General Jones. It says that there are security implications. The AWACS versions intended for them will probably not be quite as heavily loaded with valuable electronic equipment as the AWACS version for the Air Force. Nevertheless, AWACS will carry considerable sophisticated equipment beyond the present USSR state-of-the-art.

If the Soviets should gain access to the AWACS they could move ahead, in the opinion of the Director of Central

Intelligence, some five to seven years in certain technologies. More immediately, they could learn how to jam any now-contemplated AWACS version.

Would you agree with that?

General Jones: Could you tell me when the statement was written?

Senator Cohen: The statement was made in 1977 in testimony before both the Senate and the House on the proposed sale of AWACS to Iran.

General Jones: I recall that. That would mean -- '77 would mean '82 to '84 if they got their hands on it in '77. The Soviets have made major advances already and will, in our judgment, have a good lookdown AWACS before the 1985 time period. So that clock is different now than it was then.

Senator Cohen: So in other words, if the AWACS were to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union that is not of concern to you?

General Jones: No, that is not correct, Senator Cohen. I said it is of concern to me, the loss of any American equipment anyplace in the world to the Soviets.

Senator Cohen: If they have the capability why are you worried about the Soviets acquiring this information, if they have the capability?

General Jones: Well, as I pointed out, number one,

they can make some marginal improvements in their own capabilities and, secondly, it would cause some problems to us in countering it through changing our AWACS to minimize particularly the electronic countermeasures by them.

So I don't want to minimize the fact that we do not want this to fall into the hands of the Soviets and we will do everything we can to prevent it. I am saying it is not catastrophic if it does.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, let me respond to that.

If the fear that you are properly expressing and the concern that we all share were carried to their logical extent it would simply mean that we never sold anything to anybody because we would always assume that everybody else was slightly less stable than we are.

And the simple fact of the matter is we aid our defensive capabilities enormously by getting it in the hands of various nations strategically located and friendly to us around the world. There is always the risk and there is going to be a risk. But if we allow that risk to paralyze us then we would simply be in the position where we would have to spend an infinitely greater amount of money on our own defense or else leave ourselves far more vulnerable.

Senator Cohen: Well, I thank you for that, Mr. Secretary.

I was just going to add that in that testimony in '77

when State, Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence were agreed that Iranian physical security is good, the security risk is probably no more than if AWACS were deployed in Europe, State and Defense believe the risk of compromise is minimal, even though the Soviets are adjacent neighbors.

I just wonder what the consequences would be if in fact AWACS had been transferred to Iran at the time.

Secretary Weinberger: Valuable equipment was lost in Iran, valuable equipment was lost in Vietnam. The simple fact of the matter is that it was important to us to have the kinds of region or area in which to operate that we used to have in Iran. It would have been enormously to our advantage to take steps to try to prevent the Iranian government from falling.

The President is well aware of the peril and has expressed many times that he would not allow, to the greatest extent possible to him and to the American government, a similar fall of Saudi Arabia should that even be threatened. We do not think it is threatened.

Senator Cohen: Mr. Secretary, at the time that the AWACS was being considered for sale to Iran one of the principal arguments at that time was the fear of a rejection of the sale as proposed.

Now let me read a response that was given, and I am

paraphrasing now. Well, they would be left without what we consider a program for adequate air defense which I think is justifiably a military requirement. They would feel that we in effect were unconcerned about their ability to defend themselves against political threats in the future. They would think and interpret this as a signal of at least a lessening of our concern, foreign interest, in their security, the relationship between us. So there will be a multiplier effect, if you will, psychologically, politically, to a turndown.

Now one of the major concerns at that time was that if we did not sell the AWACS to Iran was that the British, our strong and good friends, were prepared to sell the NIMROD to the Iranians. And I would like to know, in the wake of not selling the AWACS to Iran, did the Shah purchase the NIMROD?

Secretary Weinberger: I don't know.

Senator Cohen: General Jones?

General Jones: No, because we had approval to sell the AWACS to Iran. I must say at that time the NIMROD capability was much, much less than the AWACS.

Senator Cohen: Now what I am asking you is, all through the testimony that I have read during that sale the alert presence of the British prepared to sell the NIMROD, and I could point out the pages that were submitted for the record.

General Jones: Senator, I submit that the NIMROD at that time was a paper airplane in the sense of over-the-land AEW. NIMROD is much better today than at that time period.

Senator Cohen: Tell me what the respective capabilities of the NIMROD versus the AWACS are.

General Jones: I can go into it in general in open session, but I would want to go into closed session to go into any specifics.

Chairman Tower: General Jones, if you will yield on that point, if you will suspend for a moment, Senator Cohen, this will not be charged against Senator Cohen's time, it is likely that other questions will come up to be answered in full would require a classified response. So in that instance we will try to arrange for a subsequent executive or closed session, either that or make classified briefings available to any Senator that requires them.

Senator Cohen: Mr. Chairman, let me withdraw the question for the time being and ask the question in a different way.

There is a notion that if we reject the sale as currently structured that this will result in somewhat of a lessening of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, that the British stand ready, willing and able to move in with their own aircraft. They have their own notions about a mideast settlement as such. They would be building much stronger

ties to the Saudis who would then be much less friendly toward Israel. And we have an opportunity to ameliorate that situation right now.

My question is, assuming the British sell them the NIMROD, is it your judgment the Saudis will rely upon the British to defend them in case of attack?

General Jones: [illegible].

Senator Cohen: [illegible] it your judgment then that they would rely upon the French if they sell them the MIRAGE as opposed to the upgraded 15?

General Jones: No.

Senator Cohen: The answer is ultimately the United States is the only country that has the capability of helping the Saudi government to survive in the event that it would come under external attack rather than any kind of subversive destabilization?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, it wouldn't require that. It would require a joint effort by a number of countries to defend the oil fields should they be invaded. Remember, the Soviets have a capability of moving in more than one arena at once with conventional forces that are very strong.

Senator Cohen: Has NATO agreed to join a deployment force?

Secretary Weinberger: No, they have not, but the

subject has been discussed and is being discussed. There has been no agreement of any kind. But the obvious importance of the security of the oil fields to the western world is such that I think that point is becoming more and more known to a great many countries.

Japan, Israel, all of these countries rely heavily on imported oil and the simple fact of the matter is there would be and would have to be a substantial, concerted effort to defend the oil fields.

And the important point, I think, is to ensure that the desire and the will to defend the oil fields by the host countries, by the owners of the oil fields, remains. And I think that the sale of this plane and the demonstration of our attitude of support is an important factor and a part of the equation.

General Jones: Senator, I don't anticipate a break in relations. I think we will continue to work with the Saudis if the sale were rejected. I would anticipate, though, that they would turn to others for much more than military equipment. They already have turned to France for much of their naval equipment and these other countries couldn't give them full defense. We need a cooperative effort.

However, I think it would be more difficult for us to moe into the area at a time of a threat or an invasion and to be able to counter it if we didn't have our AWACS there

and didn't have this close relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Chairman Tower: The Senator's time is up.

Senator Byrd?

Senator Byrd: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As one who has not made a decision on this legislation, let me make two observations and then I have several questions.

First, let me say that during the years I have been in the Senate I have been a strong supporter of Israel. I think it is a consistent, firm friend to the United States. It is a democracy. I have great admiration for the people of Israel. It is remarkable and in a sense unbelieveable how they have developed that country and especially what they have done in the way of developing the capability to defend themselves militarily. So I think Israel is important to the United States. It is strongly anti-Soviet and it is a democracy.

Now the Saudis are also friends of the United States. Saudi Arabia, I feel, is an extremely important nation to our country and, indeed, to the entire free world. It is the largest producer of oil for the entire free world. It is the anti-communist leader of the Arab Gulf states.

The Secretary of Defense this morning stated that the Saudi oil resources are vulnerable and threatened. I think that is certainly correct. When I was in Saudi Arabia last

I was impressed by what I regarded as the vulnerability of the oil resources. I think that it is under threat from the Soviet Union. As I see it, the Soviets are perhaps more desirous of getting control, directly or indirectly, of the Middle East oil fields and southern Africa, or South Africa, I should say, than perhaps any other two areas in the world. So I think we are faced with a very difficult and important decision.

Now let me ask just a couple of questions. General Jones, are you convinced that the AWACS proposal, the entire package, the total package, will not jeopardize the security of Israel?

General Jones: Not only do I feel it will not jeopardize but in the long term it will contribute to the security of Israel as well as the United States.

Senator Byrd: Is that true of you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Weinberger: Absolutely, and I would add to that the free nations of the world -- the NATO nations, the rest of the Mideast and Japan.

Senator Byrd: Now, secondly, General Jones, are you convinced from the military point of view that the sale of the military hardware embodied in the proposal is important and necessary in safeguarding the Saudi oil fields?

General Jones: I do, yes, sir.

Secretary Weinberger: I certainly share that and we

elaborated on that, Senator Byrd, in my statement as to the enhanced capability that it gives them, particularly against the new threats that are coming in from Yemen and Ethiopia, which is a considerable concern to them and justifiably so.

Senator Byrd: Now I am not clear on this next point. Did I understand one or both of you to say that it will be at least ten years beforethe Saudis will get total and unilateral control of the AWACS?

Secretary Weinberger: If they buy the plane, Senator, they would own the plane. The planes would not be delivered until 1985. Thereafter, there would be a training period because of the complexity of the plane and its equipment, the fact that it has not been conducted before, that would be required. Thereafter, even after that you would have an important American maintenance function as well as an American presence required with respect to the ground operations of the plane.

But I would see extending well into a period of ten years from delivery, yes, sir. And General Jones, I think, puts it even a little longer.

Senator Byrd: So it is accurate to say, is it, that it would be at least ten years before the Saudis get total and unilateral control of the AWACS operation?

General Jones: Senator Byrd, I want to be careful as to the word "control." They will own AWACS upon delivery.

There will be certain provisions with regard to security and operation. They will not be operational, though, until well after 1985, because of the training period.

Even beyond that, there will be continued U.S. assistance required in the way of support, people, and of supplies. There is the theoretical possibility, which I think it would be foolhardy on their party, to say we own them; therefore, we control them and we will do what we want with them. Because that would immediately jeopardize that whole support and they would deteriorate in their whole military capability very rapidly.

So even though technically they would have control, their capability with it would be nominal and would deteriorate very rapidly.

Senator Byrd: Now earlier it was mentioned about the AWACS and Iran. Did the Air Force, General Jones, recommend the sale of the AWACS to Iran?

General Jones: I think the Air Force supported.

Senator Byrd: Supported the sale?

General Jones: Supported the sale. It was an administration position but the Air Force supported the sale.

Senator Byrd: And that was in 1977, was it?

General Jones: Roughly. The '77 time period I think was when it was consummated.

Senator Byrd: As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff are you satisfied in your own mind that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia would not unreasonably jeopardize the secrets contained therein, should we say, in the event it should fall into --

General Jones: I agree with that statement, Senator.

Senator Byrd: You agree with that statement.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Senator Thurmond?

Senator Thurmond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to compliment you and the Defense Department for this decision that you made to sell the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. I have given considerable thought to this matter and did before I made this decision.

I am convinced it is in the best interest of the United States that we do this from our standpoint. We would be paralyzed without the oil we get from Saudi Arabia and, furthermore, I think it will add to our security to have these planes over there to protect us from the Soviet threat directly or throught their proxies.

I am very interested in Israel. I don't want to see any step taken to hurt Israel. I am convinced that it is in their interest that we sell these planes. There is no question they are going to get planes. They will get the NIMROD from Great Britain or they will get a plane from France or elsewhere, in which event we would exercise no

control whatever.

If we furnish these planes we will have some control and it is important, I think, that we do this. From the standpoint of Saudi Arabia I think it is best. Saudi Arabia is our friend, as Israel is our friend, and they are going to be terribly hurt, their international pride will be hurt, if we do not furnish these planes.

And then, too, I think they need these planes to protect their interest, to protect their oil, some of which they furnish us and some of which they furnish to Japan and other countries of the world.

So from any standpoint that you look at it, in my opinion, this sale should be made. I do not understand why Mr. Begin is opposed to this sale. I cannot imagine why he would be opposed. It seems to me he would be wise to recommend the sale because it protects not only Saudi Arabia, it protects Israel. And Saudi Arabia knows of our interest in Israel too.

Mr. Begin ought to know, as much as we do for Israel, that this is going to embarrass the President of the United States if this does not go through. We do not have but one President and when he makes a decision on foreign policy I will lean over backwards, and I have done it for 27 years since I have been in the Congress, whether it is a Democrat or a Republican President, to back that President on foreign

policy. He speaks for this nation and if we repudiate him here in this matter it is going to hurt his influence throughout the entire world and his leadership that he can exert in the free world.

So for those reasons I am strongly in favor of selling these planes to Saudi Arabia.

[Applause.]

Secretary Weinberger: Thank you, Senator. Those are the reasons that appeal to us.

Chairman Tower: The Chair will have to advise our guests that we do not allow any expressions of approval or disapproval.

Senator Nunn?

Senator Nunn: Mr. Secretary, do you know of any other requests from any other nations now that would involve the sale of AWACS aircraft by the United States?

Secretary Weinberger: I do not know of any pending ones. General Jones may know of some. I don't know of any.

General Jones: I don't know of any pending requests by nations, no, sir.

Senator Nunn: Can our NATO allies operate AWACS? Will they be able to in the near future? By that I mean, if we were to have a situation where U.S. technicians were not there and so forth, will our NATO allies be able to maintain and operate those planes without U.S. assistance?

Secretary Weinberger: The same conditions would apply, Senator. There would be substantial training periods. There would be substantial time involved in preparing ground crews, ground control operations, all of those things. Ultimately the answer, of course, is yes. But that training period has not been requested because of the conditions in NATO under which we all participate under an alliance and under a series of treaties.

Senator Nunn: I understand that distinction. I am just saying will the operating procedures that are now envisioned lead at some point to our allies being able to operate and maintain AWACS without American participation.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I think the issue would not arise, but the individual people -- the members of NATO nations, the non-American members of the NATO alliance -- will undoubtedly in the course of the activities with NATO be receiving training on this. They will not be receiving training specifically as representatives of that country but they will be receiving training.

And I think it is quite possible that at the end of the length of time that it takes these individuals would have all of the skills that we would have. But we wouldn't specifically set out to train the Germans, so to speak, how to use it. We set out to have them integrate as an integral part of the NATO operation.

Senator Nunn: General Jones, can you answer that as to at what stage would other nations within NATO that are our allies be able to handle these planes without American assistance if the circumstances at that time indicated that it was the chosen route?

General Jones: Senator, the best I understand it, that about forty percent of the personnel involved would be U.S., so if all U.S. personnel pulled out it would degrade the capability very much.

The front-end crews will all be of one country. The rear-end, the mission people, will be international, with Americans and others mixed in. I know of no plan to try in Europe to duplicate all of the support that we provide and the spares from the United States.

Senator Nunn: Will the United States always have someone on board those planes?

General Jones: I could see circumstances where there would not be Americans on some of the missions.

Senator Nunn: Where there would not be Americans on board?

General Jones: I think the likelihood is, since we supply about forty percent of the people, that there be Americans aboard, but I know I can check on it and confirm it, but I know of no provision at all that requires a U.S. citizen aboard a NATO airplane.

We are certainly not going to have people from a dozen different nations on one airplane, on every airplane.

Senator Nunn: General Kelley, I do not know whether you can do this in an unclassified session -- if you cannot just say so -- but what do you consider as a high threat and a low threat to the Persian Gulf area as former head of the Rapid Deployment Force?

General Kelley: I think the high threat, Senator, is quite obvious. It's the Soviet threat, which is represented in some double digit numbers of divisions which are disposed in the Trans-Caucusus, North Caucusus, Turkistan and in Afghanistan. There's no question in my mind that in this context, if the U.S. is to deploy meaningful combat power to that part of the world under any scenario, be it high threat or low threat, that it is absolutely essential that we have free and willing -- and I emphasize those two words, free and willing -- access to Saudi land based, Saudi ports, Saudi host nation support and a considerable labor pool from the Saudi Arabians.

Senator Nunn: Can you defend the Saudi oil fields without having AWACS aircraft in that area?

General Kelley: You cannot defend the Saudi air fields without --

Senator Nunn: Oil fields is what I am saying.

General Kelley: Yes, sir, I understand. If you are

talking about from an airborne threat, no, sir. I do not believe you can adequately defend the Saudi oil fields from an airborne threat without some AWACS capability.

Senator Nunn: What is the situation as far as NIMRODs? What if we had NIMRODs in there? How would NIMRODs be able to correlate with the Rapid Deployment Force? Would you be able to set up a communication between the NIMRODs and the American forces if that happened, if this sale is rejected?

General Kelley: Because of the interrelationship, the compatibility of U.S. equipment in which we have made great strides in doing ourselves, I would suggest that it would be far more difficult. I cannot say impossible, sir, but I can provide that, possibly, for the record.

But technically it is far more difficult to interface with the NIMROD system than it is with a system that is compatible to our current command and control system.

General Jones: Senator Nunn, if I could --

Senator Nunn: Yes.

General Jones: We are basically working for interoperability between the NIMROD and AWACS in Europe. So there are ways to interoperate, but it takes training, it takes procedures, so it would be more difficult even though basically you can interoperate.

Senator Nunn: So it would not preclude an air defense

coordination with a Rapid Deployment Force if they were to have NIMRODs rather than AWACS?

General Jones: You wouldn't preclude, but it would be more difficult and also one orbit doesn't give sufficient total defense and you would want additional airborne early warning. Then you would have a mix of the two.

So it doesn't preclude it, but it would be more difficult.

Senator Nunn: General Kelley, when will the AWACS aircraft that are operating now -- either General Jones or General Kelley can answer this -- when were they put in Saudi Arabia?

General Jones: Early October 1980.

Senator Nunn: Early October 1980.

General Jones: About a year ago now.

Senator Nunn: About a year ago. When did the President declare the Persian Gulf to be in our vital interest?

General Jones: At least two years ago. But we had sent AWACS there earlier for 45 --

Senator Nunn: I didn't understand that.

General Jones: We had sent AWACS there in 1979 for 45 days.

Senator Nunn: What I am trying to get at, what would we have done in that area of the world if we had had a

contingency, let's say a low threat contingency, not the Soviets directly but one of the other nations in that area that had sophisticated aircraft after the oil fields.

What would we had done with the Rapid Deployment Force in defending the Persian Gulf oil fields had that happened before AWACS were put there?

General Kelley: Let me attempt to answer that, sir, because the most critical element for the deployment of any U.S. force from the Rapid Deployment Force is to establish immediately an air superiority and air defense network. That is absolutely essential to any deployment because of the air threats in the area.

So the first thing we would have had to do, at great expense, in terms of strategic lift would be to lift an air defense or air superiority network into the area because as a commander I would never let a force flow into an area without that kind of protection. That is the essential ingredient to any rapid deployment force move into that particular part of the world.

And the success or failure, Senator, I might say of subsequent deployments after you get your air superiority and air defense network into the area, the success or failure may well hinge on how that operates.

Senator Nunn: General Kelley, what would happen if we were to have AWACS aircraft? Let us assume that this sale

is turned down for one reason or another and let us assume that we put AWACS aircraft into either Egypt or Israel. What does that do to your air situation as far as Rapid Deployment Force defending the oil in the Persian Gulf?

General Kelley: Well, it really doesn't when you look at the geography and the geographic proximity of Israel and Egypt to what we're talking about.

We are still talking about great ranges and we are talking about a threat to Saudi Arabia and not necessarily to Egypt or to Israel.

Senator Nunn: Does that mean they would be of no value, some value?

General Kelley: No, sir. They would be of some value to us as the Rapid Deployment Force. But whether or not you merely exacerbate the situation by having them in places outside of Saudi Arabia I'm not sure I can comment on.

Senator Nunn: How do you evaluate the increased risk, if there is any, to our rapid deployment mission if this sale is turned down and if the Saudis were to take out the interim aircraft and go to the NIMROD conversion? I'm asking General Kelley that.

General Kelley: This has turned out, sir, there is a much bigger issue, as you have alluded to, Senator, and I appreciate the fact that you recognize it.

The issue -- well, first of all, let me say in a

strategic and geopolitical dimension there is probably no country in this world, I feel, that is more important -- that is a personal opinion but I am sure you share it -- at least it's importance -- is more important to the free world and the future than Saudi Arabia. Well, Saudi Arabia is, without a question, as far as I am concerned, a lynchpin to a viable U.S. strategy in that region.

We must have, we would say, a free association in that area. So the consequences of not having a free and willing relationship with the Saudis, I think, are a great risk for this country, a very serious risk to this country. So I ask that the Committee not only consider the technical aspects of the AWACS but also consider the geopolitical and the large dimension of the future relations, not only with the Saudis, Senator, but with the entire moderate Arab world.

Senator Nunn: Well, I wanted to get to the question. Let us assume the sale is turned down. Let us assume the Saudis decide to phase out the operation of the AWACS and go to the NIMROD in that conversion period. How do you assess the ability of the Rapid Deployment Force to defend those oil fields as compared to the present?

General Kelley: Well, first of all, sir, I've got to get back to the context of defending it against an air threat because that is what the AWACS does and that is what the NIMROD does. They don't defend it against a ground

threat.

Also, it is very difficult to put a dimension on defending an oil field. We don't defend oil fields per se. We defend critical elements of the oil fields -- the refineries, the cracking points, the pumping stations. But you don't defend something that is hundreds of miles long and hundreds of miles wide.

So in answer to your question, as far as interface is concerned with the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, it would be in our best interests to have a compatible U.S. piece of equipment in the region and not a piece of equipment that we would not have any high degree of reliance in terms of compatibility until sometime in the future.

Chairman Tower: I am sorry. Your time is up.

Senator Jepsen?

Senator Jepsen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the area of declaring oneself, I will declare myself. I am opposed to the sale of the AWACS. I am opposed to the sale because I believe it would not be in the best interest of the United States and also because I support Israel as an ally, as has been mentioned here before.

That doesn't mean we are anti-Saudi. In fact, I concur with the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities in the Middle East. I say why not build it on the Camp David agreement as a guide to developing a stable Mideast? But

let us look at the facts and I want to ask this question to make sure I understand, Mr. Secretary, the facts as we have it proposed now to this Congress, to this Senate to sell the AWACS with ultimately no American involvement whatsoever, in other words, to sell it outright as the thing stands at this moment.

Secretary Weinberger: That is not correct, sir. The sale of the AWACS and the other enhancement portions of the package would be a final sale with complete ownership taken over. But there would always have to be, or at least for many, many years out into the future, an American presence that accompanies them. So it is not correct in any way to say that this sale contemplates no American presence.

Senator Jepsen: But it is complete ownership, their complete control.

Secretary Weinberger: Oh, of course, yes, sir, for which cash is being paid.

Senator Jepsen: Out of curiosity I would ask General Jones or Colonel Stamm or whomever, I notice that in the frame depicting the KC-707 the markings were blotted out. Was this a photograph of an aircraft of the Iranian air force?

Secretary Weinberger: I don't believe so. We've got plenty of KC planes we can photograph of our own.

Senator Jepsen: I think it is. I think it is

inadvertently a reminder of the fall of Iran at a time when we are worried about Saudi instability.

General Jones: It couldn't be because they didn't have any KC-707s. They had KC-747s.

Senator Jepsen: They had KC-707s. I think if you wanted to put it back up, I think it is very clear and I hope you don't show it anywhere else.

Colonel Stamm: It was a prototype airplane that we had markings on that we took the markings off.

Secretary Weinberger: It was a prototype. They were not Iranian markings.

Senator Jepsen: Senator Jackson made some observations which I might comment on in that we find that we are talking about this equipment. It has been described in technical terms as '60's technology, off-the-shelf technology and, of course, if the AWACS were so unsophisticated I don't know why the Soviets aren't flying something comparable at this time. And I would remind General Jones we have learned a great deal of AWACS from your previous testimonies.

February 5, 1976, the Senate Appropriations Committee, I quote, you said, "All the experts will agree that the AWACS radar is the hardest to jam that has ever been built."

General Jones: That is still true.

Senator Jepsen: Pardon?

General Jones: I would say probably the NIMROD will be

a little more difficult, but that statement is still very accurate, that it's extremely difficult to jam the radar.

Senator Jepsen: Yet in line number four of the slide, showing all the reasons why this is off-the-shelf technology and so on you say the communications link could be easily jammed.

General Jones: That's not the radar. That's the radio.

Senator Jepsen: I will also point out you stated in '78 we have also looked at the vulnerability of AWACS. I am quoting: "FOXBAT cannot do anything to AWACS until they can find it, and its ability to find it in all of the clutter with all of the other things going on is quite limited. We are finding it a very difficult problem to shoot down an AWACS in our offensive programs. It is a great technical requirement."

General Jones: That is true. We are talking about western Europe.

Senator Jepsen: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the threats to Saudi Arabia from Iran, Iraq, South Yemen and the Soviet Union. Isn't it true that the Saudis will, and you have pretty much answered this but I want to get it again for the record, isn't it true that the Saudis will be unable to defend themselves against attack from any of these countries regardless if they have the arms package or not?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, Saudi Arabia, as I

said, is a country with very long borders, very valuable assets and small defensive resources and it's going to take assistance to defend them against any kind of concerted external attack and I very much hope we would join in the assistance that is required to do that.

But there's no question either that at the moment, with respect, for example, to the points we went into earlier, that against the Israeli air force or army the balance is heavily in favor of the Israelis. But as far as external attack on Saudi Arabia from any of the countries you've mentioned, yes, it would take a concerted effort and this would be a part of that, a very vital part of it.

Senator Jepsen: Mr. Secretary, early on we have been advised here we want to stay with the military aspects of this. However, the State Department makes remarks about technology in the military and the military makes remarks about the political aspects and so on of this.

I would just ask, in your opinion, does the fact that the Saudis have played a major role in financing the Syrians in Lebanon coincide with the United States' interests?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, the Saudis, Senator, I don't know how much they have financed them, but the fact that that is important in my mind is that the Saudi government played a major role in ensuring that a conflict did not break out a few months ago and they played a major

role in persuading the Syrian government not to take steps that it was very close to being prepared to take.

And I think the Saudis have been a very important influenc in maintaining peace in that very volatile region. And I think it is vital that we continue to develop and maintain the kind of relationship with them that General Kelley described a moment ago that will enable us to perhaps have an even greater effect in bringing peace to that region.

One of the President's great hopes is that he would be able to work out with the Saudi Arabians and Israelis and others the kind of relationship that is starting to develop and has developed to a very considerable extent between Egypt and Israel, relationships that people a few years didn't even think were possible.

So I think that kind of thing, since we have moved into that area of the discussion, I think that kind of consideration is enormously important and I think it would be to a very considerable extent lost should this be rejected.

Senator Jepsen: Well, we have heard a lot of reasons why the Saudis acted to protect western interest and I think I concur with your remarks without minimizing the importance of these. I just think we should look at the other side of the coin.

Do the Saudis support the Camp David accords?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, I think that they would have to speak for themselves on that at this point. I have heard all kinds of different reports back and forth. You hear that the Saudi government was very upset with Egypt at the time of that accord and so on.

But the information I have is that those countries -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- are working much more closely together and I think that, given time, you will get an opportunity, if this sale is not rejected and the relationships poisoned thereby, I think you will have an opportunity to bring together a lot of countries that have been at sword points for years and centuries. And that is an initiative which should not be lightly tossed away.

Senator Jepsen: I agree. But on the other side of the coin, and this is military, do the Saudis permit Soviet overflights?

Secretary Weinberger: Soviet overflights? The Saudis?

Senator Jepsen: Yes.

Secretary Weinberger: No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator Jepsen: Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time -- well, are we going to have a second round?

Chairman Tower: At this point I might say that those of you that are worrying about lunch can continue to worry until 3:00, because I intend to keep us in session until that time. Unfortunately, there are great demands on this

room and we have to give it up at three.

Therefore, I expect to keep the Committee in continuous session until that time and I anticipate that there will be some time for a second round.

Senator Jepsen: If I can have a little more time, I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary or General Jones, when do you expect the Soviets to have a system comparable to the AWACS? Now you alluded to that, Mr. Secretary. I have information that their IL-76, their NATO codename CANDID, AWACS version that is under development now is going to be out sometime in '83 or '84. Is that correct.

General Jones: I think we would rather categorize it, Senator Jepsen, as before we deliver the AWACS rather than get into specifics of the intelligence estimate.

Secretary Weinberger: Probably before 1985.

Senator Jepsen: Well, do they have anything that can in any way compare to the AWACS at this present time in operation?

General Jones: No.

Senator Jepsen: No?

General Jones: They've got an AWACS-type aircraft that is an over-water type, but nothing to compare with our AWACS or E-2C.

Senator Jepsen: Their aircraft is virtually useless over land, is that correct?

General Jones: The current airplane is, yes.

Senator Jepsen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Senator Hart?

Senator Hart: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, where did the idea for the sale originate?

Secretary Weinberger: To the best of my knowledge it originated with Saudi Arabia.

Senator Hart: Is that your understanding, General Jones, also?

General Jones: Yes, sir.

Senator Hart: So you are both prepared to state categorically that the idea for the Saudis to purchase this aircraft did not originate in our government or from the United States Air Force?

Secretary Weinberger: Certainly that's not my understanding, but you will have to understand, Senator, that my ability to testify on this dates from about January 1981.

Senator Hart: General?

General Jones: Senator, to my knowledge -- and I went through it earlier -- I don't believe you were here when I went through the sequence of events --

Senator Hart: I was here and it was very vague. You said '79 or '80 that the Saudis then requested this and I

did not know. What I would like to know is whose idea it was.

General Jones: In February of 1980 they made the request that we sell. I know of no -- and I'm trying to recall any discussions or anything else. I know of no initiative on our side to persuade the Saudis to buy the airplane.

Senator Hart: Well, leaving "persuaded" aside, as far as you know no member of the United States arms sales team offered the possibility for the Saudis that this might be one system they might want to consider or something of that sort, leaving "persuaded" aside?

General Jones: I cannot vouch for what everybody said over the time period. I think it is quite self-evident after March of '79 when we deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia that the AWACS or an airborne early warning airplane was essential to the defense of Saudi Arabia and particularly the oil fields.

So I think it was a self-evident fact. But the specific, to the best of my knowledge, the specific initiative was the Saudi, for them to purchase the airplane. We were interesting in having U.S. AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia and that was one of the reasons. They were deployed in March of '79 and one of the reasons, in October of 1980.

But to the best of my knowledge it wasn't people out trying to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, to reduce the price of U.S. Air Force AWACS or whatever. I cannot vouch for everybody in the Defense Department, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Hart: General, let me ask you a military question -- first of all a factual base. How many tactical aircraft will the Saudis have when they have their full complement of F-15s, sixty?

General Jones: They will have sixty total aircraft in-country, but a substantial number of those will be used in training.

Senator Hart: And what other type of aircraft will they have, F-5s?

General Jones: They've got some F-5s. They've got some Lightnings. Those would the fighter type aircraft.

Senator Hart: All right, now, we talked about, to use Senator Nunn's and General Kelley's terms, the highest threat being the Soviets. If you were a Soviet air force general and you were to attack the Saudi oil fields, how many tactical aircraft would you commit to that purpose?

General Jones: Senator, I don't -- if I were the Soviets I wouldn't attack the Saudi oil fields. What I would want to do is to try to gain control of Saudi Arabia and the oil and rather than try to destroy the oil I would

try to take control one way or the other, invasion or whatever, using air power.

Senator Hart: For that invasion purpose how many aircraft would you commit to that purpose?

General Jones: I probably couldn't commit as many as I would like because it is a long ways from the Soviet Union, quite a few hundred miles down into the region. But it would be a substantial number.

Senator Hart: More than sixty?

General Jones: Oh, yes, more than sixty.

Senator Hart: Well, the whole purpose here is obvious, General. Even if the Saudis have this AWACS -- first of all, there are those of us who believe that maybe the highest threat is the Soviets, but the most likely threat is not the Soviets. It is internal disruption and insurrection, revolution, whatever. The same thing happened to the Shah, the same thing that is happening in a lot of those countries. And AWACS is not going to solve that problem. It is not even going to come close.

But if the threat turned out to be the Soviet threat, even with AWACS, first of all, I would parenthetically like to question a two-to-four break that I think Secretary Weinberger said earlier.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, I am glad you corrected that. That is not correct and I wanted to correct the.

record at an appropriate time for that. I was giving much too long a period of time. It is not two hours. It is a much shorter period of time.

Senator Hart: All right. But in any case, General, realistically, even with AWACS, can the Saudis do anything substantial to counter a Soviet threat?

General Jones: As I stated earlier, Senator Hart, the Saudis alone, with the AWACS and sixty F-15s could not cope with a concerted major Soviet attack on Saudi Arabia and would need assistance in that regard.

There are, I think, other threats than Soviet or internal subversion. The latter one, to me, is not a high probability. I would not characterize it as new. I think the most likely event is some nation in the region -- maybe the PDRY -- taking some action. We can't tell what is happening in Iran, some limited action from Iran across the Persian Gulf. I think those things are more likely.

But clearly the Soviet Union has a capability with air to overwhelm Saudi Arabia regardless of what Saudi Arabia does.

Senator Hart: So if you are of the view that the most difficult problem the Saudis face, you say you are not but others are, is internal political stability. The AWACS doesn't help. If you are concerned about the Soviet threat then the AWACS is not going to cure that.

General Jones: Oh, it helps tremendously, Senator Hart, to have. Now we're not just talking about AWACS here. We're talking about having an integrated air defense network in Saudi Arabia and an AWACS that is operating and interoperating with the ground entry points which can be expanded very, very rapidly if an immediate, imminent Soviet threat emerges.

Senator Hart: And an overwhelming threat eventually. I mean, the Soviets are not going to try to take over that region without committing enough forces to accomplish that. Certainly sixty aircraft are not going to make the difference.

General Jones: No, but starting with the air defense capability that is projected for Saudi Arabia and immediately building up to cope with the Soviet threat is much better than not having the capability to start with.

Senator Hart: Finally, Mr. Secretary, and I understand this all began before your watch, so maybe General Jones should comment, I was again amazed, as others were, with the slide presentation the Colonel presented to find out how inadequate these F-15s are with that enhancement. And, again having gone through that whole debate, having voted against the sale on the grounds that the representations being made at that time were clearly not accurate, we are now told here that without the enhancements that are

contained in this package that the F-15s really cannot do the job.

That all, I can point out, is almost directly contrary to the entire record of just three years ago. General Jones, if you would like to comment on that.

Secretary Weinberger: Let me just say briefly, Senator, that one of the things I cannot be responsible for is what happened prior to January or representations that were made then.

I did first hear about the Saudi request for the AWACS and the enhancement package in December of 1980 and it was very strongly supported by the prior Administration. And after examination it seemed to me something that we should support too and we are.

But as far as the plane is concerned, the fighter plane, it is a capable fighter plane. It is important for its range to be enhanced and it is important for the things that the United States uses with it to make it a more capable fighter plane be added because it is equally important for that region to have this kind of capability as it is for ourselves.

So what we are talking about is not an inadequate plane. What we are talking about is a more adequate plane given the acceptance of the assumption, which I certainly accept, that that kind of plane is necessary for the defense

of that region.

General Jones: Senator Hart, just to add a point, it is a much different circumstance now than in 1978. In 1978, to the east Saudi Arabia had a country -- there was a country that was friendly to the west -- Iran -- and we weren't concerned about a threat or major threat from that direction and Daharan wasn't critica. And now Daharan is very much exposed and much more heavily dependent on the rear bases in Saudi Arabia to handle any threat to the oil fields.

So it makes a much different geographical situation with Iran now not friendly to the west.

Senator Hart: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Senator Quayle?

Senator Quayle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, do you think the sale will go through without any modifications?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, I have long ago given up predicting what will happen in Congress or, indeed, among the electorate.

Senator Quayle: What kind of convincing evidence -- let me rephrase that. Do you think that in the Administration that they are convinced there is going to have to be some modification or compromise in order to gain the necessary votes?

Secretary Weinberger: I wouldn't be speaking for the Administration on that, Senator. I just don't know. My own feeling is that the sale, as proposed to you, is of vital importance. I think it is very necessary that it go through. I think it is very necessary that it go through with the concurrence of the Saudi government and I very much hope that the majority of the Senate will see it that way.

Senator Quayle: Fifty people have signed the disapproval resolution. Another five have evidently indicated privately that they will go against it. There is probably another four or five that would probably vote against it if there are not any changes, and I just want to know what we need to do to convince the Administration -- you are the Secretary of Defense -- that the sale is not going to go through as is.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, I am not saying that there will not be any changes. All I am saying is that at this point I am not able to report to you any proposed changes or anything of that kind. I am saying that I think the sale as proposed is very much in the national interest of the United States, but this is not to say that I am reporting to you that there are absolutely no changes or anything of that kind. I do not know is what I am saying. I am saying that it is vital that the sale go through, and go through with the concurrence of the Saudi government.

Chairman Tower: If I may suggest to the Senator from Indiana, these are political questions that I am sure we would all like to have the answers to. As a matter of fact, we may be better able to provide the answers than the Secretary, but I would remind members of the Committee that we are supposed to address ourselves to the military, technical and geostrategic aspects of the issue.

Senator Quayle: Mr. Chairman, I would try to adhere to the guidelines, and to sort of summarize the things that have been developed here, starting with Senator Jackson on control, people are concerned about the control of the AWACS. There is another theme that is paramount that runs through many of us, and that is this has been presented as a loyalty test to Saudi Arabia, to get into the whole quid pro quo.

So let me, as we explore compromises, because I think we should, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, to look at some compromises, let me ask you to critique a compromise or an idea that I personally have to see the down side, the positive sides, because I am convinced, I am convinced -- and I believe that if you talk to many other Senators that they will say that, unless there is a change, this is simply not going to go through.

If you are convinced and of that opinion, to get to the control aspect and to get to the so called loyalty test aspect to Saudi Arabia, what if we would say, instead of selling five planes to Saudi Arabia, which is the proposed sale, that we would not sell five, that we would sell three, and that the United States would continue to operate at least three? It is my understanding and according to the testimony it takes four to have full coverage.

Secretary Weinberger: It takes five for full coverage.

Senator Quayle: It takes five, five to have full coverage, one is back here, four are over there.

Secretary Weinberger: No, it takes five to keep one in constant orbit, which is the optimum way to use the capability.

Senator Quayle: Okay, it takes five to have full coverage. To get a better cooperation with Saudi Arabia, to have more control, more input, cooperation, what would be the down side of the arguments against, say, well, okay, at this time we want the sale to go through, we want to improve our relationship to Saudi Arabia, instead of selling five, we will sell three, and then by, say, 1988, subject to the approval of the Congress, we could talk about the additional two or three AWACS at that time?

Would you comment on that?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, I would comment on that, Senator. You were asking a moment ago what was the matter with selling five or what was the matter with selling three? Well, the problem is that it takes two to sell one, and if the Saudis decline on the ground that we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to Israel, we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to Egypt, we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to many, many other countries, and they say we do not want anything to do with the downgrading of our sovereignty that is involved in

that kind of an arrangement, we will go elsewhere and buy them.

And then you would be in a situation where they would have virtually the capability that seems to be of concern without any restrictions, without any kind of compromises, without any kind of arrangements of any sort.

For my part I would find it very difficult to blame them for taking that kind of a position should various so-called compromises of this type be offered. This is not to say that it is not perfectly proper to work out safeguards for the sale of our arms and our material. We do that with other countries. We do that with Israel, we do it with a number of countries. But it is to say that there is no basis whatever for applying a totally different standard to Saudi Arabia, given their relationships to us in the past and given the very valuable contribution they have made just recently to preserving peace in that area.

Senator Quayle: Mr. Secretary, I do not think we would be placing any additional restrictions, perhaps, that we should, but as far as just reducing the sale from five to three, just sell three planes instead of five.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, their military authorities would tell them that five planes are essential to keep one in the air at one time; that three, therefore, would be of very little use; and their request, and indeed, their need

is for five. And so this would be a compromise, I think, which would serve no purpose whatever but to anger a close and good friend, and understandably anger them.

Senator Quayle: Well, if the alternative is not to have the sale go through, which would be your --

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I would not want to start guessing in that kind of a game, Senator, because I do not think it is very profitable for any purpose. It is all hypothetical anyway. This is not based on a kind of a numbers game or trying to cut an offer down the middle or anything of the kind. It is based on military necessity, and the military necessity is that given the assumption that the AWACS capability is necessary in that part of the world for Saudi Arabia, then you do not want to sell them half a plane. You want to sell them enough so that they can keep one in the air 24 hours on continuous patrol. And that, plus the other parts of the enhancement package, is what they have concluded they need.

Senator Quayle: Mr. Secretary, in all due respect, if we want to see the sale go through for AWACS, it is going to have to be changed.

You want to take the position that it is not going to be changed, and that we should not have it changed, we should not even be talking about this, and I am just telling you that it is going to be a complete exercise in futility

because it is simply not going to go unless there are going to be some changes.

And I would think it would be incumbent upon people such as yourself to explore some of the technical changes that we can make to go along with Saudi Arabia, if they are going to be this ally of ours and we want to help them and they want to help us, that in this predicament that we find ourselves today, if we want to support the President -- and my inclinations are to support the President -- but we are not going to give carte blanche, and it is not going to be an automatic support of the President, that we are going to have to get into a position where there are going to have to be some modifications.

And so far I read in the newspapers talks about some modifications. I think we ought to actively explore this. And that is why I brought up the question, and just to say Saudi Arabia is going to say no, well, I think that if we want this to go through and it is that important to us that we had better actively pursue some sort of options and compromises.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, you are making several assumptions that really are not based on fact, and what I am saying is that this morning I am requested to and prepared to and am trying to testify as to the military capabilities of the plane and the military necessities of

the sale, and I do think it is vital that the sale go through, and I do not think it is at all impossible that other arrangements can be developed. But I am suggesting to you from the point of view of the military necessities and the requirements of Saudi Arabia and ourselves, that selling three instead of five planes is not the kind of arrangement that I think holds any hope in it.

Senator Quayle: Okay, Mr. Secretary. I think I have gotten the point across and I would hope that there would be, you know, at some point talk of compromise.

Secretary Weinberger: Sure.

Senator Quayle: I mean, there is no alternative. That is the bottom line. If you look at the bottom line -- you do not have to ask me; you can ask other Senators if there is any question.

Chairman Tower: Do you want to ask me?

Senator Quayle: Yes, I will ask the Chairman, not on my time, if you would like to comment on whether the sale, as is, is going to go through, if you would take a different position than myself.

I see my time is up.

I would strongly disagree and urge him to join in the process of coming up with some modification and compromise also, because it has got to be done.

Chairman Tower: Well, Senator, I do not think this is

a matter that can be negotiated in a Congressional Committee. In fact the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy resides in the executive branch and not in the Congress.

Senator Exon.

Senator Exon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are several issues that I would like to go into, if I could.

First I would like to ask the question whether or not any of you believe that it might be wise to separate the two issues, the F-15 enhancement, on one hand, and the AWACS on the other, or do you feel it must go forward as a package?

Secretary Weinberger: Personally, Senator, I feel that it is an appropriate and suitable combination of increased capabilities. As I say, the previous Administration had that view, and I discussed it with them prior to inauguration, and I share the view that that is the kind of capability as a whole that I think is vital to add to that region. And General Jones obviously has his point, too.

General Jones: Senator Exon, I think the package is well supported from U.S. national interest, and I would go ahead with it as a package.

Senator Exon: General Kelley?

General Kelley: I agree completely as a package.

Senator Exon: Gentlemen, I head on national television this morning an officer -- I did not catch is name -- that

said that if we did not go ahead with the AWACS sale, that the Saudis would be prone to purchase the NIMROD from the British, and that as a result they would have an airplane that would be more of a threat to Israel than the AWACS plane that we were proposing that they purchase.

Now, I want to ask whether or not you agree with an officer that said that on national television.

And secondly, I would ask you if, as has been stated around this table this morning, we are primarily concerned about the security of Saudi Arabia, then I ask why would they want an inferior product if their primary interest is their own security?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, I do not think -- and I want General Jones to answer this, too, because he is seeing the NIMROD, and just as late as yesterday, I believe, but I would say that the -- I do not know who the officer was, and I did not hear the telecast -- I will say parenthetically there has been an awful lot of general misinformation in all forms of --

Senator Exon: When you say general, do you mean rank or --

Secretary Weinberger: No. I do mean sort of rank, too, in a way, but in any event, I did not hear that particular telecast.

I suppose what was meant was that Israel would face a

greater threat, not from the NIMROD or its inherent capabilities as oppoosed to the AWACS, but the fact that it would be sold in all likelihood without any of the kinds of arrangements that Senator Quayle was mentioning a moment ago, or that others have mentioned as being tried to work out in a way that would have in mind the security of all the countries in that region. And I think that that must have been what was referred to.

The NIMROD is a good plane. I do not think it is as good a plane as the AWACS, but I think it is a very good plane, and I think it would be important that all of those additional capabilities be surrounded with such arrangements as could be worked out with the security of the whole region in mind.

General Jones: Senator Exon, I would not chategorize it as an inferior airplane. In some regards it has less capability, in some areas more capability. It has a number of areas of more advanced technology as a result of being many years later in development. And you could argue the specifics of the details of whether it would be more threat or what to Israel.

I think the overriding consideration is the United States is clearly dedicated to the security of Israel, and it would be in Israel's best interest to have the country that has influence on the airborne early warning platform to

be the country that also has a commitment to the security of Israel.

Senator Exon: General Kelley, do you agree?

General Kelley: I completely agree, sir.

Senator Exon: Let's get into a matter that has come up on several occasions, and I believe February 1980 seems to be a key date here.

Before I ask the question I just want to make it clear to my colleagues and you gentlemen who know, I think, that at least this Senator did not object when about three-fourths of the United States Senate sometime last year wrote a letter to President Carter objecting to the F-15 sales, because I wanted to listen and hear what the reason for that was. But now it seems to me that I hear a very clear signal that not only was the Carter Administration proposing to sell the F-15 enhancements to the Saudis, but indeed, they were also agreeing behind the scenes to furnish some AWACS.

Is that a fair assessment?

You would not know, I do not suppose, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Weinberger: I can only speak as of the period in late December 1980 when former Secretary and former Deputy Secretary of Defense both spoke to me about their support of this package, and I discussed it with them. That was the first time I had had anything connected,

that could be remotely called an official discussion of it. General Jones, of course, has been here for many more years.

General Jones: Senator Exon, as I indicated earlier, in late November the Saudis were told by the previous Administration that we are favorably disposed to an early and positive decision on the future sale of AWACS.

Senator Exon: I would have to say to you, General, that for one who stuck his neck out to some degree, which I am used to doing, I would not have indicated that I might support the F-15 enhancement sale had I known at that time as it comes out now that the Administration, the Carter Administration were indeed plotting and planning to also come along with the AWACS sale. I am not sure that that is the best leveling with those of us who are supposed to share some of the decision-making duties with whoever is President of the United States.

General Jones: Senator, I know of no desire at that time, or effort, to try to hide what was being considered. It was fairly much public knowledge of the various items requested by the Saudis. I think it was an honest misunderstanding. When people talked about the air defense package, they equated that with F-15 enhancements when the air defense package included AWACS.

Senator Exon: All right, let's go into one other matter that I think has a direct relationship technically on

not only the safety of our advanced systems, but the overall chance of conflict in the area.

As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, there have been little if any detailed discussions or public explanation of the arrangement that was made with Mr. Begin and President Reagan when they made some kind of an arrangement when Mr. Begin was here a couple of weeks ago with regard to prepositioning of equipment and other things that have only been hinted at.

Is it possible in this testimony, Mr. Secretary, for you to give us and the public at large some details of what agreements were made between the President and the leader of Israel at that time?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, I cannot give you very many details because there was not any agreement made. There was a lot of discussion on the part of Mr. Begin and General Sharon with respect to various types of assistance or cooperative moves that the Israelis were prepared to offer to the United States in the event of some kind of attack on the region as a whole. Everything that he discussed he emphasized -- both of them emphasized in their opening statements were in connection with possible attacks on the region as a whole.

And I asked once specifically did that mean a Soviet threat, and the answer was of course.

What was discussed was the possibility of prepositioning some supplies and medical facilities, utilization of Israeli hospital facilities, prepositioning of troops, aerial cover, all of these things far down the road in some kind of a contingency aspect. I mention them in an open hearing because I have read about them in the newspaper, but I have read about them in the form that some kind of agreement was entered into, whereas what was actually taking place was a discussion of a number of suggestions the Israelis were making as to ways in which the defense of the whole region could be enhanced.

Senator Exon: Was that tied in, Mr. Secretary, with failure or success of the Administration's proposal to sell the F-15 enhancements and the AWACS to Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Weinberger: No. General Sharon and Prime Minister Begin raised the matter independently of any other discussions, and did not link their offers to anything of the kind.

Senator Exon: Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Senator Denton.

Senator Denton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This question has been characterized as one constituting a test of loyalty to Saudi Arabia, a question of whether there is too much technology loss being risked,

whether therer is too much threat to Israel, whether or not the equipment -- and this is the opposite argument of the technology loss -- is so outmoded as to represent a farse, crass on our part and stupid on the Saudis' part, and the characterization has also been made to the Secretary and the Chairman and General Kelley that you cannot win unless you change the agreement as it now stands.

I would implore my colleagues, knowing of their depth of interest in this country's security and of their expertise on this Committee, and the colleagues in the Senate as a whole, to keep open minds until they get more facts. I believe we have prepositioned ourselves, and with more thrust than rudder, as we used to say in aviation, with more determination than information, we have already taken positions which I think should be subject to change as we learn more.

This is one field in which I happen to have had personal involvement for a number of years. I tested both the aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy in the original AWACS configuration represented by the RC-121D and the WB-2. It so happened that I had had so much experience in that previous in lighter than aircraft which were able, by virtue of the vibrationless platform, essentially vibrationless, to go into the experimental testing better than aircraft could, I had a jump on everybody and I had to

end up doing the Air Force test because the Air Force blew theirs and could not make the plane work. And an Air Force general assigned me the job of redoing the Air Force's evaluation, and it came out it worked, all because I had a couple of good technicians and a lot of previous experience, no special smarts.

So I do know something about the technology involved, about whether it is outmoded, what it can do and what it cannot do, and I find some of the questions, although extremely well intended, to exhibit the need for further information such as confusing radar jamming with communications jamming, the dichotomy between technology loss and outmoded technology, that sort of thing. I hope we will be open minded as we address this.

I yield to no one in my regard for Israel as a staunch ally, a friend to whom we have undying commitments, but I have, as some of the gentlemen at the table in front of us, witnessed what I considered to be a failure over a period of years to perceive accurately from the political point of view certain strategic situations in which we have come out grave losers.

I do not mean to say that I or any of the military have not made errors, too. I am saying that the political perception and the failure to deal with it properly politically resulted in many of these issues going down the

drain. I refer to after the Cuban missile crisis, which I think we handled extremely well, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, many parts of Africa, and Iran, and I do not blame any of these on any of the gentlemen or what they represent in front of this table; I blame it on us. I think the executive usually knew what the initiative was that should be applied, and in spite of inconsistencies, apparent inconsistencies such as one agreement two years ago and now we are coming on with the AWACS, the fact is that the security problem confronting the United States is the number one issue. It is not loyalty to the United States, because all of us are loyal to the United States, but it is a clarity of perception regarding what is in our national interests, and I do not mean just partially as was the case in Vietnam. I mean absolutely as in the case with the oil fields in Saudi Arabia wherein our very way of life and the very existence of the rest of the democratic nations in Europe, Japan and so forth would actually go down the drain.

We have a vital national interest matter here. It has both diplomatic and military proportions of the highest order. I beg my colleagues to desist from an insistence that they will not change positions because they do not have all the information as yet.

The oil in Saudi Arabia is something we cannot do without. I am in no way suggesting that we bargain away our

interest in the oil in Saudi Arabia for our integrity with respect to our relationship with Israel, and I believe this arrangement is in the long range security interests of Israel as well as the economic interests of Israel.

The direness of the military consequences of this to us could be phrased as follows: we are now playing desperate catch-up ball in an area where our vital interests are involved, and we have not even come up with an idea or a policy much less a commitment as to how to deal with it. That is why General Kelley is sitting here, rapid deployment force, But we do not have, as I see it, even the men for that. We do not have a consensus of perspective out there in the United States among the public, nor here in Congress, about why you exist and why that force must come into being.

We have our lives depending on the oil. We have no specific commitment which we can identify now by which we could, if the Soviets or anyone else moved in there -- what could we do? We cannot launch ICBMs against the Soviet Union because of that. We simply die on the vine because General Kelley could not land on a hostile shore in the eastern Mediterranean with any chance of success, with any reasonable chance of success because, as you gentlemen know, the chances of reinforcing Europe in a conventional or nuclear war are very limited.

In this situation, with the typical defensive

pcsitions, the Khyber Pass, areas like that where one man can defend against 40, it is absolutely essential that we develop some kind of means of establishing not a "fustest with the mostest" but at least a "fustest" on that land mass over there, and Saudi Arabia is one of the keys to that. Israel is another. And they both recognize that. And we can make arrangements with both which are unilateral on the one hand and bilateral on the other which promote our mutual interests.

Aside from that, I agree 100 percent with the validity of our President and our Secretary of State in proceeding toward that which personally I have been advocating for about seven years, namely, the development of a consensus among the Arab, Israeli and Christian nations in that area, an awareness that the USSR is such a threat to them that it should transcend the long-standing grievances that they feel one toward the other. I believe that that has made progress, as Secretary Weinberger mentioned. I believe not to continue in that direction would be a vast error on our part.

The failure to honor this agreement at this point as oposed to the positive part of it -- and you asked -- I think the Secretary dwelt on the positive aspects with regard to the United States and did not develop it, but I would ask this question, is it now in the pot, in the

agreement that the AWACS which they would own and use would or would not relay to USN ships, E-2Cs and on to the Task Force 70 carriers?

Is that a hope or is that a fact within the deal?

General Jones: We intend to continue that relay, and we have had no indication from the Saudi that they would not do it because it would be in their interests as well as ours. We do not have a signed agreement that says under every circumstance, ad infinitum, that we will have it there.

Senator Denton. In other words, pragmatically, it is inevitable that the Saudis would pursue that.

Secretary Weinberger: It is appening now, and we have no reason to suppose that they would not want that capability to continue. We certainly would want it to continue.

Senator Denton. I would strongly recommend that if my colleagues have not looked at the means which can be set up, AWACS to USN ships, to E-2Cs on back to Task Force 70 carriers for substantial intervention in the event of an air attack against those airfields, there is an immediate military advantage, but long range down the pike for the establishment of some kind of commitment and confluence of policy over there, I see this arrangement as in our national interest, in the Saudis' national interest, in Israel's national interest, and an extremely important matter in

which I hope my colleagues will remain receptive as to further information.

Thank you.

Chairman Tower: Senator Levin.

Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first of all would hope that colleagues who have taken a position in support of this sale would likewise keep an open mind in terms of additional information which I am sure will be supplied to this Committee by people who oppose this sale, and I trust the Committee will be listening to such people. But that is a two-way street, and I would agree that all of us should make the best assessment of this policy as we can.

First, I want to ask the Secretary relative to statements that he made which I believe seriously downgrade the need to protect our sensitive equipment.

Mr. Secretary, you said, for instance, earlier this morning that we cannot be guided in sales of sensitive equipment by being constantly worried about whether or not it will fall into enemy hands. Those are your words. You also said if the fears of this were carried to their logical extreme we would not sell anything to anybody.

First, I would like to ask you whether or not it is not true that there is classified equipment aboard the AWACS plane, and if so, would you identify that equipment?

Secretary Weinberger: There can be classified equipment put aboard it, Senator, yes, or there can be classified equipment that is not aboard it. The degrees of classification vary, and there is an ability to put in or take out various pieces of equipment, some of them of great importance, all of them, really, of great importance to the United States.

My statements were simply not that we should not take every precaution to prevent the possibiity of any of our equipment or any of our technology falling into Soviet or unfriendly hands, but my statement was also to the effect that if that is the sole consideration, and if we demand 100 percent guarantees that anything we have will not fall into enemy hands, then we are put in the position of not really being able to place it in any country, and we have even had some losses from within continental United States.

Senator Levin: Well, I will let your statements stand for themselves.

But is it not true that you intend, if this sale is approved, to sell classified equipment on the AWACS planes to the Saudis?

Secretary Weinberger: Some classified equipment would be sold with it.

Senator Levin: Would you identify that classified equipment briefly?

Secretary Weinberger: I will in closed session. I will not here.

Chairman Tower: I do not mean to intervene, but I do not think we should ask the Secretary to answer that in open session. I can guarantee that you will get an answer to his question in closed session. That should be for the classified record.

Senator Levin: That was provided to us over the telephone from the Pentagon by lines that are unprotected.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, I am sure we all make mistakes, and we all try to err on the side of being as secure as possible, and if you have had some conversations about classified matters over nonsecure lines with Pentagon people, we will have to make our instructions to them somewhat more explicit. But we do make every effort to safeguard that classified equipment and classified information. And we will do that under any circumstances. My only point earlier was that if you follow these procedures that you are talking about, nothing could ever be sold to anybody, and that would be very much worse for our national security.

Senator Levin: Do we have a policy, Mr. Secretary, relative to the sale of classified military information and hardware with foreign governments which is known as the National Disclosure Policy?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Levin: And under this policy is there not an Interagency Civilian-Military National Disclosure Policy Committee which is set up to implement it?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Levin: And is it not true that exceptions to the policy which are set forth are normally considered and decided by that Committee?

Secretary Weinberger: There are exceptions to that exception, Senator.

Senator Levin: I understand, but I said normally, is it not true that --

Secretary Weinberger: I do not know that I would characterize any of the practices as normal. There are provisions for some exceptions. There are provisions for actions outside that particular exception and outside that particular committee.

Senator Levin: Would you acknowledge that usually, the great, vast majority of such sales are handled by said committee?

Secretary Weinberger: Sales that do not require an exception might very well be characterized as such, but the whole point of having the exception is that there are exceptional circumstances, and that was the situation with this sale.

Senator Levin: Well, was there an exception needed to the Naticnal Disclosure Policy for the sale of the AIM-9Ls to the Saudis, whether it was to be granted by that Committee or yourself? Was there an exception required to the National Disclosure Policy for that sale that was --

Secretary Weinberger: Well, there was an exception made, yes, Senator.

Senator Levin: So that presumes there was one needed.

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Levin: And that exception to our National Disclosure Policy was made by the committee or by you?

Secretary Weinberger: It was made by the President of the United States.

Senator Levin: By the President, all right.

Secretary Weinberger: On recommendation from me.

Senator Levin: Without getting into what items are classified, would you agree that there are also classified systems on the AIM-9L?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Levin: And would you agree with the letter which was received by Congressman Lantos from some F-15s pilots that those AIM-9L missiles -- and now I am quoting them -- the pilots wrote, "We are at a user level and can attest that the AIM-9L thrust the American fighter pilot a very large step ahead in air combat over any other military

force. The AIM-9L is superior because it is a point and shoot weapon with excellent probabilities of success. The AIM-9L is so superior that it gives the American fighter pilot a believable chance of survival when confronted with the overwhelming numbers of Soviet aircraft we must face."

Would you agree with that assessment by those user pilots?

General Jones: Senator, as I indicated earlier that in talking to people that have this concern I did not talk to these specific individuals. I do not agree with them in the context of what the Soviets could do. As I said, the image is they would immediately get their hands on a large number and could use them against us, and even if they got ahold of the missiles, it would be very difficult for them to use those specific missiles. They will not be provided to Saudi Arabia for a number of years. The Soviets are making good progress in comparable missiles.

So when you talk about the difficulties to the Soviet Union, most understand the problem and their concerns are lessened.

Secretary Weinberger: Let me answer, if I could, Senator, also, from a nontechnical point of view. I think it is an exceptionally good and valuable weapon, and I think we want it where it will do the most good for us under the proper safeguards, and I think that this sale to Saudi

Arabia constitutes full qualification under both fronts.

Senator Levin: All right.

Now, we are going to be asking you either in executive session or for a written answer the question about what equipment on that AWACS plane is secret, is classified, and I am not going to pursue that because of the Chairman's comments.

But my question is slightly different.

If in fact the radar, including its computer, is classified, if that is your answer -- and each of us on this Committee will read your answer or hear it at a later time -- would you think it would be fair to describe the radar as follows, as you did in your testimony? The radar is mid-1960s pulse doppler textbook technology. A comparable computer is available commercially.

Secretary Weinberger: I think that is a fair statement, but I think that the combinations and the additional things that are available on the plane make it very, very valuable. But there have been considerable questions raised as to the radar specifically, and a lot of misinformation about it.

Senator Levin: I understand. And you would think that would be a fair answer --

Secretary Weinberger: May I finish, Senator?

Senator Levin: You would think that would be a fair

answer even if it turns out that you tell us in executive session that that same radar which you call mid-'60s technology, and the comparable computers available in Radio Shack, you think that would be a fair answer even if it turns out that these are classified materiel?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, let me complete the answer to the previous question, and then I will answer that one.

The simple fact is that the particular radar involved is of the kind correctly described in my statement. There are a great many other things on the plane, and there are a great many other things that in combination together make it an extremely valuable and important instrument.

But there has been a great deal of misinformation in the last few weeks about the vital necessity of this particular radar that is used on the plane, and I think it was important, and it is essential, and so far as I know it is correct to describe the radar as I have described it.

And in executive session or in classified answers to any questions you may have, we will be glad to elaborate on some of the additional equipment that is there on the plane and would be intended to be sold.

Senator Levin: Thank you.

You made a statement earlier, Mr. Secretary, that the Saudis recognize and accept the need for special safeguards

in this case. Consequently, they have agreed to extensive, jointly planned and monitored security arrangements that satisfy stringent U.S. requirements for safeguarding our equipment.

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Levin: Have you actually seen those agreements with your own eyes?

Secretary Weinberger: I have seen a lot of them, and a lot of them are of the same general kinds that we apply to other nations such as Israel, Egypt and others when they buy our equipment.

Senator Levin: No, you were talking about special safeguards in this case.

Have you seen the agreements you referred to which embody the special safeguards in this case?

Secretary Weinberger: I have seen some drafts of things that I am advised are considered acceptable for the safeguarding of the equipment, yes, sir.

Senator Levin: Are these written, signed agreements?

Secretary Weinberger: They are not signed because the discussions have not been completed, but there are drafts of clauses that I would consider adequate for the protection and safeguarding of the items that are covered by the sale.

Senator Levin: Is there any reason why we should not have signed agreements to make sure there is no mistake this

time --

Secretary Weinberger: No.

Senator Levin: -- before we finally vote on this?

Secretary Weinberger: I do not know to what you have reference when you say make a mistake this time, but the agreements, once they are completed, are documents that so far as I know are available.

Senator Levin: Will be available.

Secretary Weinberger: Will be available and would be, if they contained classified material, why, they would be so marked and transmitted to you with those protections, but transmitted to you.

Senator Levin: My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: Much has been made of what apparently some seem to think is the internal fragility of the Saudi Arabian government, and very often the analogy is drawn between the government of the Shah and the government of Saudi Arabia. I would like to submit the situations are not analogous, that in fact the government of the royal family in Saudi Arabia is far more firmly institutionalized than was the more autocratic government of the Shah.

Further, the Shah's regime was threatened by Muslim orthodoxy. In fact, that is not the case in Saudi Arabia because the government of Saudi Arabia is a very orthodox Mulsim government.

I would further note that there is a great deal more homogeneity among the native population of Saudi Arabia than there is in the case of Iran; that there is no strong, well-organized and well-disciplined Marxist infrastructure in Saudi Arabia; and that further, the wealth of Saudi Arabia has been, to use an old term in this country, very successfully trickled down to the lesser elements of society.

I would like to ask the Secretary and anybody else that would want to comment, if that is not a fair statement?

Secretary Weinberger: I think that is a very fair statement, Mr. Chairman, and I think comparisons with the former Iranian government are very poorly taken. I also think that we have that example before us, that that did happen, and we have a President of the United States who declares his determination not to let that happen in Saudi Arabia, to the greatest extent and using the full authority of his office to try to prevent it. And that we did not have in Iran, and I think that that is an essential difference.

But I also think the way in which the entire Saudi society has been structured and the way the modernization into the 20th century has come in conjunction with, in cooperation with the religious leaders, and the way in which the, as you have correctly pointed out, the homogeneity of the population make very significant differences.

I think we have and have been dealing with a very strong, very stable, very able government, and I also think that there are -- certainly the episode of the Grand Mosque was a surprise, it was an episode. It again taught, I think, a very healthy lesson, and I think we will see that in connection with some of the protective measures, security measures that have been taken with this years hadj.

Chairman Tower: Mr. Secretary, much has also been made of the fact that Saudi Arabia does not recognize the Camp David Accords.

Is it not true, however, that Saudi Arabia has not rejected the Camp David approach so long as it produces a comprehensive solution?

Secretary Weinberger: That is correct, and I think we should also bear in mind that Prince Fahd, the Crown Prince, presented a plan designed to bring peace to the entire region, as early, I believe, as late as August of this year, that had some features in it that seemed to many to be particularly hopeful, with a full recognition for the security and continued sovereignty of all of the nations of the region, had other elements in it. It is not automatically the agreement that everybody may want to support right now, but it had elements that I thought contained substantial hope for the future stability and peace in the region.

Chairman Tower: Mr. Secretary, is it true that President Sadat has enthusiastically endorsed the AWACS sale and characterized it as being essential to the peace process in the Middle East?

Secretary Weinberger: I didn't hear, who?

Chairman Tower: President Sadat.

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, that is correct.

Chairman Tower: General Kelley, would you discuss in more detail how the Saudi AWACS capability would enhance the capability of U.S. military forces in any operations to protect our interests in the region?

General Kelley: Mr. Chairman, could I answer that in either closed session or provide an answer for the record?

Chairman Tower: We would be delighted to have you provide an answer for the record.

General Kelley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: We will put that in the classified record.

Mr. Secretary, if the NATO AWACS aircraft were not owned by NATO, not purchased out of infrastructure funds or NATO funds, would the United States have objected to outright sales to individual NATO member states?

Secretary Weinberger: Not that I know of. I certainly would not, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower: General Jones, what would your view on

that be?

General Jones: It was clear to me that there are many nations in the world that we would have been willing to sell AWACS to including our NATO allies outside of the alliance.

Chairman Tower: Let's talk about the balance of risk a little more.

I think we have to confess that there are some risks involved. Certainly we do not want our equipment to fall into Soviet hands. But in fact, do we not always take some kind of risk when we transfer sophisticated systems to another country?

In fact, Saudi Arabia does not have diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Secretary Weinberger: That is correct.

Chairman Tower: Which means that Moscow does not maintain the kind of intelligence network in Saudi Arabia that we even find in Western European countries, perhaps even our own.

Secretary Weinberger: That is right.

Chairman Tower: And is it true that actually most information that the Soviets have on American systems has come from sources other than from captured equipment?

Secretary Weinberger: Generally that is so, yes, Senator.

Chairman Tower: General Jones, would you agree with

that assessment?

General Jones: I think that is correct, Senator.

Chairman Tower: Is it not true that aside from Egypt, the only Muslim country that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel is Turkey?

Secretary Weinberger: I did not hear the first part.

Chairman Tower: The only Muslim country that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel, aside from Egypt, is Turkey.

Secretary Weinberger: I believe that is correct, yes, sir. I would want to verify that. I know Turkey does. I believe that is the only one, yes.

Chairman Tower: Well, there are of course obviously some who do not that are very good friends of ours, including some of the black African nations, is that not true?

Secretary Weinberger: That is correct.

Chairman Tower: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that it is essential that we establish military cooperation with Saudi Arabia as a means of bringing not just military stability or military security, but also political stability to the area?

Secretary Weinberger: Oh, yes, I do indeed. I think that if the Saudis were viewed by the Soviets or Soviet agent countries as a country that was not supported strongly

by a number of people, including ourselves, their position would be more vulnerable, to our enormous disadvantage.

Chairman Tower: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Jackson?

Senator Jackson: Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for your knowledge of history, but I did want to take exception to the contention of homogeneity of the people in Saudi Arabia.

How many Yemenis, Mr. Secretary, are there in Saudi Arabia out of 5 million people?

Chairman Tower: I said native population.

Senator Jackson: No, these are not natives. That's my point.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, there are a large number of different populations that come and go and work on the projects there and so on, and there is a Shiite element, but there --

Senator Jackson: Well, that is religious. I am talking about separate people.

There are over a million Yemenis there. There are over 200,000 Palestinians, and the Bedouin is a minority.

Secretary Weinberger: The important point, I think, to bear in mind, Senator, is that the number -- I do not --

Chairman Tower: Wait. Let me clarify that I made a distinction between the native population and the foreign

workers that are in Saudi Arabia in rather substantial numbers.

Secretary Weinberger: These are a floating population, Enator. They come in and work on particular projects and leave. The Koreans have a large representation from time to time, but the country itself, the people who are under the government of Saudi Arabia generally speaking has a high degree of homogeneity, much more so than many of the other countries of the Mid East, except, perhaps, Kuwait, which also has a very large number of foreign workers in and out from time to time.

Senator Jackson: And a very large Russian representaton right on their border.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, on their borders, yes.

Senator Jackson: No, I say they have a very large Russian embassy in Kuwait.

Secretary Weinberger: Oh, in Kuwait. Yes, they have a large Russian embassy there.

Senator Jackson: I suggest, Mr. Chairman, we get for the record the actual demographics and how long they have been there and so on, because the Paks have come in recently, and the Koreans, but the Yemenis have been there a long, long time.

But I do not want to get into that.

Chairman Tower: Senator Jackson, I believe that has

already been provided for the record in a previous briefing.

Senator Jackson: All right.

Secretary Weinberger: It is a little hard to identify -- the Yemenis would indicate that they are all the same people. There are a lot of people from Yemen who are in and out, and I would not know how long any one of them had been there for any length of time.

Senator Jackson: Well, let's let the experts get that in. I could not let stand the idea that Saudi Arabia's population is fundamentally homogeneous because I do not think that is the case. But let's get the facts in the record.

General Jones, I would like if you would supply for the record all documents, studies, memoranda, recommendations relating to AWACS for Iran. I think the phrase that you have used all the way through here relates that you were favorably disposed in support of AWACS for Iran.

I think it is important for this Committee to find out actually what went to the Secretary of Defense or to the President, because it does have relevancy in this situation.

If you will supply that information.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator Jackson: And likewise, I would like to know just exactly what went on during the transition between the Carter Administration and the REagan Administration.

It is common talk, Mr. Secretary, in this town that you got stuck with a commitment to the Saudis. Well, let's get it all in the record.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I will be glad to tell you right now, Senator. I had two or three conversations with Secretary Brown, including one from Tokyo asking if I would meet with Secretary Clayter, which I was glad to do. I met with Secretary Brown when he returned. There was never the slightest doubt as to their strong support, and the reasons for their strong support of this entire package.

Senator Jackson: You mean AWACS.

Secretary Weinberger: I mean everything. I mean the whole package.

Senator Jackson: When was this?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, it was in December. It was in mid-December and early January.

Senator Jackson: I was having trouble finding out myself about it, and I want to say to you that I was briefed by the State Department in February, at their request, and I asked about AWACS and they said it is no way being considered. That was on February 26.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, you asked me about the way

in which I became familiar with it during the transition period, and I have --

Senator Jackson: And beyond. When did you come to the conclusion in your own mind that it ought to be recommended to the President?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, sometime between January 20 when I had access to all the materials, and somewhere -- I do not remember the precise date it was recommended to the President, but it was in February, I believe, toward the end of February.

And I think one point should be very clear in the record, and that is there was never the slightest disagreement by any members within the Administration of the importance of this package being sold to Saudi Arabia. There was no disagreement about that at all. I understand some of the common wisdom in this town. I understand some of the newspaper articles. I have to tell you, sir, they are wrong.

Senator Jackson: Well, may I tell you what is right, though?

In February when they came up I asked specifically about AWACS, and I was told it is not under consideration.

Secretary Weinberger: Did you talk to Secretary Haig?

Senator Jackson: No, sir. He sent these people up.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I talked to Secretary

Haig, and I know there was never any doubt about the importance --

Senator Jackson: You can ask Secretary Buckley. He came up. I did not ask for the briefing.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I can tell you, sir, there was never any doubt as to the recommendations that went to the President, nor was there any dispute. There were differences of agreement with respect to some of the timing or some of the very technical aspects of the submission, but there was never any doubt about the idea that this sale as a whole was in the vital interests of the United States, should be recommended to the President, was recommended to the President.

Senator Jackson: But let us get the facts in here because what you are saying is, I assume, that the State Department knew at all times what was going on here.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, I certainly assume so. They had --

Senator Jackson: Was Secretary Haig briefed all during this period?

Secretary Weinberger: To the best of my knowledge. He and I discussed it, and there was never any disagreement about anything except one portion of one part of the timing of the actual submission.

Senator Jackson: But do you not agree that it is a

little bit unique having a request come from the State Department -- I did not ask for it -- and asking that I ought to be briefed on it?

You see, let me just say why we are in this confusion.

Secretary Weinberger: I am just not familiar with that aspect of it at all.

Senator Jackson: Well, I gave you the date and I gave you the time.

Secretary Weinberger: I am not disputing. I am just saying I am not familiary.

Senator Jackson: Well, look, what really happened here is they violated the fundamental Arthur Vandenberg rule. Arthur Vandenberg, as you recall, in the 80th Congress, laid the rule down. He said we Republicans want to be in on the take-offs, not just the crash landings.

Why was the Congress, knowing the history of all of this, not brought into it? I understand that even the Majority Leader on the Republican side was not brought in in the Senate until after the fact.

Secretary Weinberger: I have no knowledge of that, Senator. To the best of my knowledge, it was a matter of common knowledge among a lot of people that the proposal was before the previous Administration, was before this Administration, and while the proceedings of the National Security Council are, of course, classified, the National

Security action following that action, recommending it to the President, was widely known, and there was never any reason in my mind to question whether anybody else in the Administration knew about it at all.

Senator Jackson: But do you not agree that if there is a lesson to be learned from this, that it would have been wise to consult with the Majority and Minority Leaders? That is all I am saying.

Secretary Weinberger: My understanding was there had been consultation.

Senator Jackson: Before the decision was made?

Secretary Weinberger: I do not know the timing, sir.

Senator Jackson: Could you supply that for the record?

Secretary Weinberger: We can certainly try to find it out. It will have to come from other sources besides the Defense Department because we followed simply the basic idea that we were asked to give our views to the Council, did give our views, and did give them to the President.

Senator Jackson: You see, the tragedy is -- and I will quit on this point -- the tragedy is that we all want to have AWACS deployed out there, but the tragedy is that there was a lot of confusion going on.

Clearly the consultation should have taken place. This was a major matter of foreign policy. Anyone who has been around here knew or should have known that that was a fact.

Secretary Weinberger: No question about it.

Senator Jackson: And I just hate to see this kind of fractious situation develop. But there it is.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, Senator, I would just like to remind you most respectfully that assuming all of that is correct, and assuming you are correct -- and I never have any problem with that -- advance consultation, and I am always for it, but assuming that it was not properly done in this case -- and I do not know that it was not -- I certainly do not think that that is a reason for not supporting the sale. The sale has independent validity, totally aside from any of those considerations.

Chairman Tower: Gentlemen, as the risk of being fractious myself, I think we had better limit the return questions to five minutes to give everybody an opportunity, and if there is time after that, then we can go to a third round.

General Jones: Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief comment on Senator Jackson's request for information on Iran, to clear up any misunderstanding.

He indicated that I used the words "favorably disposed." Those were words with regard to the previous administration's discussions on AWACS to Saudi Arabia, with no equivocation on our part with regard to the recommendation on the sale to Iran. It was supported, and I

do not hold those documents. I can work with the Defense Department, but if that clears up --

Senator Jackson: But you recommended it uniequivocally.

General Jones: For Iran there was no question.

Chairman Tower: Senator Humphrey?

Senator Humphrey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, what will be the effect on the fleet in the Indian Ocean on the cut proposed in military spending for 1982 through 1984?

Secretary Weinberger: We will have to go down to a one-carrier group in the Indian Ocean.

Senator Humphrey: Well, what do we have now? What magnitude of change does that represent?

Secretary Weinberger: I know what we have. I am asking if it is classified..

We maintain between one and two carrier groups in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean at the present time. My problem is, Senator, everything that crosses my desk practically is classified and I never remember what I should be talking about and what I should not in open session.

But the budget cuts you refer to will require us to go down to one carrier group in the Indian Ocean.

Senator Humphrey: From two at this time?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Humphrey: So we are talking about a 50 percent reduction?

Secretary Weinberger: Well, 50 percent, one and a half groups, somewhere between 35 and 50 percent.

Senator Humphrey: That is a very substantial decrease

in our capability --

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Senator Humphrey: -- in the Indian Ocean. This includes the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey: So at the very time when we are rattling our sword and threatening to defend with force if necessary our vital interest in that part of the world, we are reducing our naval presence, which is our only meaningful presence in terms of projecting force, by 30 or 40 percent, is that correct?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

General Jones: Senator, now that we can go through the Suez Canal with most of our ships, we have much greater flexibility between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. So we are now maintaining about one and a half carrier groups. We will be down to something probably over one in the future in the Indian Ocean, but a quicker capability than we had before to augment.

Senator Humphrey: Well, are you satisfied with what is proposed?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, I think it is entirely fair to say that if we had additional resources of the type that we initially had planned, which we agreed should be reduced after discussions with the President in view of the

economic situation, if we had -- the original request we put in was the one that we felt was proper, and that would have maintained one and a half carrier groups in that area at all times.

Senator Humphrey: Well, it sounds to me pretty draconian. Is not the Navy's budget capable of absorbing these cuts without this reduction in forces?

Secretary Weinberger: Senator, there is almost no way in which you can make cuts involving $2 billion in the fiscal year 1982 and $5 billion in '83 without reducing the capabilities of the United States. Now, we believe that what we have with these cuts will enable us to do a very considerably greater amount than we have been able to do before.

But you cannot reduce the budgets of the Defense Department by these amounts, which as I have said on other occasions, it is only in Washington where these would be considered trifling reductions. You cannot reduce them by these amounts without getting into the bone and muscle of the Department's activities.

The way we save money is to try to do things that are authorized for less money. But when you make reductions in outlays and have their consequent reflections in the authorization figures, which are very high, then yes, you are going to reduce the capabilities of the United States.

And everybody understands that.

We also have the obligation of trying to restore the economy.

Senator Humphrey: That is true, that is a valid consideration. But it seems to me, at a time when we have acknowledged so clearly or most belligerently our interests in the Middle East, for us to be reducing our presence, our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, in the Arabian Gulf or the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, is a very serious matter indeed.

And I think this whole question which we are considering today ought to be considered in that context, among others.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, the sale was considered in that context. The sale adds substantially to the security of the United States, and it is a point I have made repeatedly and it is a point that I am absolutely convinced of. We help ourselves enormously by this sale, and I do not think that -- I think that is a primary, and it has to be a major consideration.

Now, in the Indian Ocean General Jones said we can get back and forth from the Mediterranean a lot more rapidly than we could a few years ago. We have air cover, all the rest. But this capability with the AWACS of being able to give greater warning time and greater intelligence gathering

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SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 29, 1981

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS ALAN ROMBERG.

Q. IS THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT TO SEND ANOTHER TEAM OF EXPERTS, WHAT HAVE YOU, TO SAUDI ARABIA TO NEGOTIATE A COMPROMISE ON THE AWACS PACKAGE?

A. I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY TEAM GOING OUT TO SAUDI ARABIA TO NEGOTIATE.

Q. WHEN WILL THE NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVE IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND DOES HE HAVE ANY ORDERS TO GO STRAIGHT IN AND DISCUSS THIS AWACS PACKAGE?

A. AMBASSADOR MURPHY WAS CONFIRMED ON FRIDAY, AND HE HAS GONE TO SAUDI ARABIA. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS ISSUE, YES.

Q. HAVE THE BRITISH DISCUSSED WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD--HAS THE SUBJECT OF THE NIMROD, THE BRITISH ALTERNATIVE-TO THE AWACS PLANE, COME UP IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE U.S., AND HAVE THE BRITISH SAID THEY WOULD-NOT;SELL IT TO SAUDI ARABIA UNLESS THE U.S. OKAYED THAT.

A. I'M UNAWARE OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS. I HAVE NOTED PRESS REPORTS THAT PUBLICLY MRS. THATCHER INDICATED THAT SHE HOPED THE AWACS DEAL WOULD GO THROUGH, BUT IF IT DIDN'T THEY WE PREPARED TO SELL NIMROD. BUT THAT,AGAIN, IS PRESS REP ORTS.

Q. GO BACK TO MURPHY A MOMENT. YOU WOULD KNOCK DOWN ANY REPORTS THAT MR. MURPHY HAS TAKEN A SPECIAL PROPOSAL OR MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SAUDIS?- HE WILL BE THERE JUST FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS?

A. HE WILL, I'M SURE, DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. I DON'T WANT TO CHARACTERIZE WHAT HE WOULD OR WOULDN'T DO. HE WILL CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS. I'M SURE HE WILL BE-AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS DIALOGUE.

Q. GOING ON TO SAUDI ARABIA, IS THAT IN ADVANCE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, OR WAS HE ROUTINELY PLANNING TO GO AT-THIS TIME?
A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE WAS AND WHETHER THIS REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM IT.

Q. ANY RESONSE TO THE QUOTE, "THREATS, WARNINGS," AS ONE OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS HERE CALLED IT, BY FAHD TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS IN CONGRESS THAT IF THEY DON'T,-THEN BLAH-BLAH? THEY DON'T AGREE WITH AWACS, I MEAN, WITH THE AWACS SALE? YOU KNOW, THERE IS A REPORT THIS MORNING IN-THE WASHINGTON POST.

A. I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON HIS REMARKS AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS.

Q. ARE THEY TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THIS ADMINISTRATION?

A. ANYTHING THAT PRINCE FAHD SAYS IS OBVIOUSLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT.

Q. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TOLD MA'ARIV AND YEDIOTH AHARANOT THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSED TWO WEEKS AGO THAT THE ISRAELI PLANES FLY ABOVE THE CLOUD COVER OVER LEBANON. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ON IT, AND WHO PROPOSED SUCH A THING?

A. NO, I HAVE NOTHING ON THAT.

Q. YOU TOOK A QUESTION YESTERDAY AS TO WHETHER AFTER TOMORROW'S FORMAL NOTICE THE AWACS PACKAGE MAY BE ALTERED OR NOT.

A. I SAID I WOULD LOOK INTO THAT. THIS IS A TECHNICAL

QUESTION. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT WHETHER TECHNICALLY IT COULD BE ALTERED OR WHETHER IN POLICY TERMS IT WOULD BE ALTERED.

Q. EITHER WAY.

A. IN TECHNICAL TERMS, I THINK IT DEPENDS--THIS IS AGAIN A QUESTION SIMPLY OF THE RULES.

M; UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IF THERE WERE A PLAN TO EXCEED WHAT HAD BEEN SENT UP IN SOME SORT OF A NOTIFICATION IN ANY OF THESE SALES, THAT THEN THE NOTIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN AND RESUBMITTED.

I AM NOT REALLY AN EXPERT ON THIS AND I WOULD CAUTION YOU ON HOW YOU USE THIS INFORMATION, BUT THAT IS HOW I WOULD RESPOND.

Q. YOU WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE 50-DAY PERIOD?

A. THE INFORMATION I HAD THIS MORNING ON THAT WAS THAT

IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE 50 DAYS. I SUPPOSE IT DEPENDS ON THE NATURE OF THE ALTERATION. THIS IS ALL VERY HYPOTHETICAL. I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE SINCE IT IS ALL HYPOTHETICAL.

Q. HAS THE ADMINISTRATION RETAINED SOL LINOWITZ IN ANY CAPACITY?

A. I HAVE LOOKED INTO IT THIS MORNING, SINCE I SAW THE NEWSWEEK REPORT OF THAT, AND I CAN'T FIND ANYONE WHO IS AWARE OF A FORMAL ROLE FOR LINOWITZ. HE CONTINUES TO BE VALUED FOR HIS VIEWS AND EXPERTISE, AND HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS, BUT IF SOMEBODY ELSE KNOWS OF A SPECIAL ROLE-- I HAVE TIRED TO CHECK IT AS WIDELY AS I CAN, AND I HAVE NOT FOUND ANY INDICATION THAT HE HAS BEEN FORMALLY BROUGHT ON AS A CONSULTANT.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM REPORTS OF "DISAGREEMENT" BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH MR. ALLEN ON THE HANDLING THE AWACS CAMPAIGNING AND LOBBYING, ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION, RATHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

A. I BELIEVE I ADDRESSED THIS YESTERDAY AND I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY ADDRESSED IT IN HIS APPEARANCE ON TODAY SHOW THIS MORNING. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER ON THAT. CLARK